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QUALITY-OF-LIFE ETHICS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE:
THE DEMISE OF NATURAL
RIGHTS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION FOR THE DISABLED
AND INCOMPETENT
Robert A. Destro
Much like the current debate over other related civil rights areas such as
affirmative action, religious freedom2 , and discrimination on the basis of
age3 or handicap4 , the legal debate over the rights of the disabled and sick to
basic medical care, food and water has largely taken place at a rhetorical and
pragmatic level rather than one of substance. To be sure, the central ethical
and legal dilemmas have sometimes been discussed in the cases', but the
courts have largely avoided both meaningful discussion of the implications
of the "value of life" ethic which drives their holdings, and the effect that the
common-law judicial preference for "case by case" analysis6 will have on the
directon of the law over the long term. It is as if the core ethical issues -
those which relate to the "value" of the life at stake - have been resolved by
a tacit agreement to disagree on the ultimate question: whether the law has
the right to base the protection it affords upon a subjective evaluation of the
"quality" of an individual's life. The debate can then take place on a level
where the highest value appears to be reaching some agreement on a policy
which appears to accommodate conflicting ideals and values involved.7 Thus
the focus in the "hard cases" now reaching the courts is generally on who
* B.A. 1972, Miami University, J.D. 1975, University of California, Berkeley. Assistant
Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; Member,
United States Commission on Civil Rights.
1. See infra notes 10, 13, 68, 77, 85, 91, 242 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 97, 114, 210, 242 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 24-71 accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
6. See id. 98 N.J. at 387-88, 486 A.2d at 1244.
7. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 159 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). See also Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for A Life-Protective Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1252-61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Needfor Life-Protec-
tive Amendment].
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shall make the decision, rather than what decisions they should make; or on
the most effective method by which to resolve the difficult medico-legal
problems now facing the courts, rather than on the core "value of life" issues
presented by the cases themselves.
When "value of life" issues are discussed, it is often in a religious context.
This, in turn, all too often gives rise to the complaint that to resolve the core
issues themselves is to attempt to impose a certain social morality on those
who would prefer that the law adopt a different moral perspective.
8
Unfortunately, such attempts to avoid the inevitable do not work in the
life of the law; for the march of stare decisis9 is inexorable. Today's implicit
assumptions drive tomorrow's decisions on the same or similar topics, and
the law rapidly reaches issues which, only a few years before, would have
been considered unthinkable for judicial resolution'. In the pages which
follow, I will try to draw a few parallels between the debate over some of the
8. Such arguments generally rest on a broad understanding of the values of "privacy"
and "self-determination", and see ethical or moral argument which does not further these
values as attempts by others to impose their own ethics on those who do not share them. See
generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561
F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter cited as DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT]. See also W.F. Buckley, "Firing Line," Public Broadcasting
Service, January 5, 1986 (debate between Rev. Robert Barry and Ms. Alice Mehling, Executive
Director of the Society for the Right to Die).
9. Stare decisis (literally, "the matter has been decided") is the term used to describe the
reliance of common law courts on the weight of precedent.
10. Compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973) (stating that the decision
had nothing to do with the rights of the father or any other person); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) (lack of maternal health rationale invalidates abortion regulations which limited
access to the procedure) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (use of
race as a criterion for admission to a university is permissible when race is only one of many
factors considered) with Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(father has no right to consent); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416, 427 n.10, 439-41 nn.29-31, 446-49, 468-71 & n.12 (1983) (majority opinion per Pow-
ell, J. and dissent per O'Connor, J.) (municipal regulation of abortion procedures designed to
protect maternal health struck in toto because Court felt that they burdened right to abortion;
abortions may be performed on immature minors without parental notice or consent upon the
order of a court notwithstanding provisions of Ohio Juvenile Code and court rules requiring,
on constitutional grounds, that parents be notified of any proceeding involving the interests of
their children) and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (private plans giving
preference on the basis of race are permissible under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(d)(1982), even though it forbids racial discrimination in private em-
ployment). But see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (race
discrimination in layoffs prohibited by Title VII); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320,
331-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting on the grounds that all forms of discrimination on the
basis of race are illegal, regardless of the race of the victim). The "incremental" development
of the law from its basic assumptions is discussed infra text accompanying notes 78-96, 241-44.
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major civil rights issues of the day and the developing law and ethics dealing
with the rights of handicapped newborns,1 the helpless and dying.
Part I of this article will attempt to identify some of the basic legal issues
in the debate over the rights of the disabled and aged to minimal health care
and nourishment. Part II will argue that the practice of defining the rights
of the person functionally, rather than as a matter of principle, is an old one
which had largely been eliminated after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that it is now resurgent in some quarters as a means to an
end which would be impossible were the definition to be based on an explicit
principle of equality. In the context of bioethics, this debate has come to be
known as the dispute between the "sanctity-of-life" ethic and the "quality-
of-life" ethic, and Part II will examine its importance in the context of con-
stitutional law. Part III will argue that the process of case-by-case analysis
is, by its nature, a slope, and that without the anchor of a clear agreement
over ethical principles governing the equality of human persons, the law will
progress in linear fashion to the ultimate realization of the principles upon
which it is based. It will contend that ambiguity in the law governing courts
and surrogates creates an unfettered discretion which is inconsistent with
basic constitutional protections, and that stare decisis will hamper thoughtful
11. Too often commentators do not distinguish between cases involving children born
with a malformation or congenital defect which is correctable or treatable (handicapped
newborns) and children who are simply born too early (premature babies) or whose conditions
are ultimately incompatible with life and where treatment will simply prolong the process of
dying. The decisionmaking process for the latter involves a determination to withdraw treat-
ment because further treatment would be futile and the child is in the process of dying. Such a
decision is based purely on medical factors. In the case of a handicapped newborn, however,
the decision-making process is often based, not on medical criteria, but on quality-of-life fac-
tors. Where treatment is withheld because the child will continue to live with a disability, then
the decision is based'on discriminatory attitudes toward those with disabilities. Where the
decision is based on sound medical judgment that the treatment is futile, the decision cannot be
described as one raising civil rights concerns.
The distinction is important. If the two types of cases are considered to be conceptually
identical, then it becomes easy to describe the decision-making process as identical as well,
even though some decisions can be said to be based on valid medical criteria and others on
illegal discriminatory attitudes. See Hearings on the Protection of Handicapped Newborns,
United States Commission on Civil Rights, at 4-5, 22-26 (June 12-14, 1985) (testimony by C.
Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service; David McLone, M.D.,
Chairman, Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Children's Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illi-
nois; and Mildred T. Stahlman, M.D., Director, Division of Neonatology, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity). See also In re.Infant Doe, No. GU8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12,
1982), affid sub nom., State of Indiana on Relation of Infant Doe by Guardian, No. 482 S139
(Ind. S. Ct. May 27, 1982), No. 482 S.140 (Ind. S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
961 (1983).
The analytical distinction set for the above is well-settled in American employment discrimi-
nation law. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1195-96 (1976).
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attempts to force reconsideration of prior decisions which are alleged to be
erroneous and subversive of the rights of individuals. 2 The article will con-
clude by rejecting both the functional definition of the human person, and
the primary role of courts (and of the ethicists upon which they rely for
assistance) in what I consider to be the case-by-case erosion of fundamental
human rights principles.)
3
I. GETTING BACK TO BASICS: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED,
TERIMINALLY ILL, AND AGING
The best place to begin the discussion of the rights of the disabled, ill or
elderly in this country is with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States; for it figures prominently in virtually every aspect of
the discussions which follow. It provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 14
The present discussion begins with the Equal Protection Clause. It provides
12. Cf City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419 n.l
(1983) (opinion of the Court per Powell, J., discussing the role of stare decisis in constitutional
law in the face of an argument that the Court's approach to the issue was wrong as a matter of
constitutional law).
13. See infra notes 121-98, 241-44 and accompanying text. A key consideration, of
course, is the identity of the governing human rights principle at issue. The courts have only
recently begun to address the issue in the context of bioethics, see infra Part II but have been
wrestling with the same type of issue in the ongoing debate over the equality principles which
are the foundation of the nation's civil rights laws. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See also infra notes 122-
32.
At issue in all three cases were federal statutes which explicitly forbade discrimination on
the basis of race, and in all three strong policy arguments were made that justice required a
reading of the statute other than in accordance with its literal meaning. In Stotts and Weber
the issue was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids all racial preferences in
employment - as the language provides - or only those which are not designed to increase
minority participation in the workplace: i.e., discrimination aimed at minorities which suffer
"invidious" discrimination. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(d) (1982) (making it unlawful
to "discriminate ... because of... race" in hiring, promotion or job training) with Bakke, 438
U.S. at 324, 357-62 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). In Bakke, the
issue was whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the four-
teenth amendment forbid the use of race in university admissions.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 5 The construction given the clause by the United
States Supreme Court is rather involved, and the short excursus into the
complexities of its construction which is necessary to an understanding of
the legal arguments which follow has been relegated to the footnotes.' 6 For
15. By its terms, the clause applies only to the several States, but the Supreme Court has
construed the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, as including
"an equal protection component". See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L.
REv. 541 (1977); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 516-19 (1978).
16. There are several levels of judicial scrutiny which can be brought to bear on a legal
classification which has been challenged on grounds that it violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Currently known as "two-tiered" analysis, the level of scrutiny depends upon the
interests at stake and the degree to which they are protected by the constitution or cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court.
The first, and most lenient, is sometimes referred to as the "any reasonable basis" standard
and appears in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). It provides that the
legal classification in question will be upheld if "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it... [and that o]ne who assails the classification ... must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Id. at
78-79. A slightly more rigorous version of this standard appears to suggest a more active
judicial role. It appears in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). It provides
that "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object to the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415. See generally W. LOCK-
HART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1981). Beyond
these basic standards are the second-tier, or "higher" levels of judicial scrutiny which are
reserved for legal classifications which involve "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classes of individ-
uals. The "suspect" category, which includes race and national origin, is the highest level of
judicial scrutiny and results in almost certain invalidation of the challenged classification.
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
but cf United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The "quasi-suspect"
classifications, alienage and illegitimacy, raise rather complex questions concerning the as-
serted justification for the classification, and the burden of proving the need for the classifica-
tion is on the state. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984) (alienage); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (illegitimacy); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)
(alienage); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (illegitimacy).
In recent years the Court appears to have developed a "middle tier" scrutiny which is ap-
plied to legislative classifications based on sex. This standard focuses on whether the gender-
based classification is substantially related to an important governmental objective. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). Whether this is a new "level", or merely a reformulation of the slightly more rigorous
Royster test is beyond the scope of this essay.
These "standards" are worthy of mention in this section because the Court's recent terms
1986]
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present purposes, the discussion of relevant equal protection standards will
focus on two potential types of discrimination: age and handicap, 7 or
disability.
Discrimination on the Basis of Age
Discrimination on the basis of age is a relatively new and undeveloped
concept in American law. Beginning with the Older Americans Act in
have seen an extension of its willingness to invalidate legislative classifications if they reflect
"irrational prejudice" or tend to perpetuate a stereotyped "archaic or overbroad" view of the
individuals affected by the classification. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. 473 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982). The Cleburne case, for example, involved exclusionary zoning of the men-
tally retarded, and indicates that a majority of the Court is willing to scrutinize the factors
which seem to motivate the classification, even though some "rational basis" might be found
for it. Notably, however, it has refused to extend the "quasi-suspect" or "suspect" labels to
cases involving either age or mental disability, and appears to prefer a case-by-case approach to
the particular justifications raised, rather than a "blanket" assumption that the classification is
defective unless related to some important governmental objective. Compare Cleburne, 473
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58 (1985) (retardation) ("[I]f the large and amorphous class of the
mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect ... it would be difficult to find a principled way
to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in
this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to
set out on that course, and we decline to do so.") and Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age) with, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 735 (1982) (majority opinion of O'Connor, J., applying the standard developed for
gender cases and looking at traditional prejudice as one factor; and dissenting opinion of Pow-
ell & Rehnquist, JJ., arguing that the standard should only be applied to those cases where the
classification is alleged to harm members of the class alleged to be adversely affected by the
classification). It should be noted, however, that discrimination on the basis of age and handi-
cap are prohibited by statute under certain circumstances. See infra notes 18-20. Since either
condition may play a role in medical treatment decisions, the use of either condition as a
rationale for withholding otherwise available medical treatment should raise a number of im-
portant constitutional as well as statutory questions. This point is discussed in greater detail in
the text accompanying notes 24-62.
For an extensive discussion of the concept of equal protection and its application to specific
types of classifications, see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 516-687 (1978). Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
17. Although the term "disability" is to be preferred on the basis of its greater descriptive
accuracy, the term "handicap" is also used in this context because it is the terminology of the
statutes governing the rights of the disabled. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg.
12,985 (1969) (prohibiting employment discrimination by the federal government on the basis
of, among other things, "handicap"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination against "otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual[s] . . . solely by reason of handicap, .... "); 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (a)(1) (1982) (conferring
jurisdiction on the United States Commission on Civil Rights to investigate discrimination on
the basis of, among other things, "handicap"); The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
Quality-of-Life Ethics
196518 and continuing with the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act,' 9 the United States Congress has expressed a clear concern
that the elderly be accorded both the attention required by their special
needs and equality of treatment in the workplace.2° To date 45 states and
the District of Columbia have followed suit and have prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of age in employment and other fields.2 At the constitu-
tional level, age has not been made a "suspect" classification under the Equal
Protection Clause, but members of the Court have indicated that age-related
legal disabilities would be looked at with somewhat greater scrutiny than
other types of classifications.22 For purposes of this essay, however, it would
not be entirely accurate to discuss discrimination on the basis of age as a
separate category; for most of the problems which will be discussed are not
solely a function of age. Rather, they are "mixed" questions, involving those
whose illnesses or disabilities leave them vulnerable to discrimination. It is
at this point that the age of the individual can and has become a factor in
decisions not to provide food, water or other basic medical care.2a Thus,
where discrimination is on the basis of age-related disability, the topic will be
discussed under the standards appropriate to disability generally.
Discrimination on the Basis of Disability
By contrast with the law governing discrimination on the basis of age, the
law governing discrimination on the basis of handicap or disability is devel-
oping at an increasing pace.24 Federal law requires that any federally funded
18. Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1982).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
20. See generally H. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION (1984).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200, etseq. (1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940, et
seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2512, etseq. (1981 & Supp. 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West Supp. 1984), §§ 112.043-.044 (West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4101.17 (Page 1980), §§ 4112.01, et seq. (Page 1980 and Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.31, et seq. (West 1974 & Supp. 1983-84). It should also be noted that age dis-
crimination does not affect only the elderly; the young, especially children, may be victims of
discriminatory treatment as well. See, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 2d 721, 640
P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982); Adrian Mobile Home Park v. City of Adrian, 94 Mich.
App. 194, 288 N.W.2d 402 (1979). See generally Travialo, Suffer the Little Children-But Not
in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional View of Age-Restrictive Housing, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 295
(1979).
22. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
23. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Heir,
18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 644 N.E.2d 959 (1984). It is necessary to distinguish between cases
which involve the very young - i.e. the extremely premature newborn where the attempt is
not so much to treat as it is to bring to a level of physical maturity which will enable the
individual to survive on his own-and those which involve disabilities. See supra note 11.
24. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (constitutional standard for
1986]
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program or activity must refrain from discriminating against an "otherwise
handicapped" individual "solely on the basis of his handicap,' and many
state and local laws provide similar protection. 26 The present analysis there-
fore will begin with an examination of basic federal standards governing dis-
crimination against the handicapped generally, and relate them to the
question of discrimination against the disabled in the provision of basic
health care services. That such a case is currently pending in the United
States Supreme Court27 and raises many of the conceptual issues central to
this section provides both a convenient starting point for the discussion, and
a concrete example of the analytical method challenged in this essay.28
In a series of recent cases expanding on the meaning of various federal
laws governing the rights of the disabled,' 9 the United States Supreme Court
discrimination against the disabled in cases involving exclusionary zoning); Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (coverage of funded programs); Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985) (application of "disparate impact" theory as a matter of law
or regulation); Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) (relationship of the Education of the
Handicapped Act, §§ 601, et seq., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq., (1982) [hereinafter cited as
E.H.A.] to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) and the
fourteenth amendment); Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (extent of rights
under E.H.A.); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (limits on
reach of Section 504).
25. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) provides, in
relevant part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ....
See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (federal funds need not be given
with the "primary objective" of promoting employment to subject the recipient to the require-
ments of Section 504). The definition of the term "handicapped individual" is found in 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982): "the term 'handicapped individual' means * * * any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment."
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West Supp. 1985); N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
02.4-03 to 4-06, 14-02.4-08 (1984); OHIo REV. CODE § 4112.02 (Page 1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-50-103, -104 (1979). Unlike the federal government, the states are not constrained
by the need to tie non-discrimination provisions to a funding source or some matter of federal
concern such as interstate commerce, but may prohibit the discrimination directly, without
reference to a jurisdictional "handle".
27. Heckler v. American Hosp. Ass'n, No. 84-1529, cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Hospi-
tal Association v. Heckler is unreported, but that court relied on its decision in United States v.
University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'g 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1983). The
decision of the district court in the Heckler case, which also relied on the decision in United
States v. University Hosp., is reported at 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
28. See infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
29. See cases cited supra note 24.
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has pointed out that the Congressional concern which prompted their enact-
ment was a dual one: to protect the handicapped from the discriminatory
acts of others30 and to eliminate what might be called "benign neglect"
based on "thoughtlessness and indifference.",
3 1
That the Congressional concern was for both the social welfare needs and
the civil rights of the disabled is critically important. Although they are
related issues, they are not identical in either form or substance, and are
often confused in debates over policy. 32 The main point to be made here is
that, to date, the Supreme Court has begun to distinguish clearly between
the two in an attempt to further both policy goals without subordinating
either.
Thus, in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.33 the
Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause forbids exclusionary
zoning which would make it impossible for the mentally retarded to live in a
neighborhood group home environment. The rationale and method of anal-
ysis is instructive, for it illustrates the Court's increasing willingness to con-
30. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. -., 105 S. Ct. 712, 718-20 (1985) (holding that
Section 504 would clearly cover cases of intentional discrimination against the handicapped,
but refusing to hold either that the regulations promulgated under the statute are limited to
such cases or that the statute necessarily comprehends the use of "disparate impact" analysis);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (coverage of funded programs);
Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
31. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 712, 718 & nn.12-16. (1985). The
sources cited in the footnotes make it clear that the Court draws a bright line between
"thoughtlessness and indifference" which, though neglecting the needs of the disabled, might
be considered "benign" in that they are not intentional or "invidious". Footnote 12 is
instructive:
To be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination against the handi-
capped do exist. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOM-
MODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The
Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Re-
spect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 401, 403 n.2 (1984).
Neglect of the disabled which is intentional - such as denying food and water or necessary
medical care to the ill or handicapped - would not, and should not, fall into the "benign"
category. See infra text accompanying note 51.
32. The debate over the relationship between a "social issue" and a "civil rights issue" is
one which has, of late, taken up much time and energy among my colleagues on the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, and is far beyond the scope of this paper. For an expanded
discussion on the differences between the two concepts, see Destro, Equality, Social Welfare
and Equal Protection, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1986). The Supreme Court itself
obliquely recognized the same distinction in Alexander v. Choate when it quoted the brief of
the United States Solicitor General as follows: "Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously
be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is 'collapsed' into one's definition of what
is the relevant benefit." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 29 n.36, Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. .. ,105 S. Ct. 712, 721 n.21 (1985).
33. 473 U.S. -,105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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sider statutes having an impact on the disabled on the basis of an inquiry
into their consistency with the principles underlying the Equal Protection
Clause, rather than on the basis of a blanket constitutional standard which
gives greater weight to judicial sensibilities than it does to legislative
judgments.
The Court began its discussion of the constitutional standards which gov-
ern legislation having an adverse impact on the mentally retarded with a
review of the general standards which are applicable to cases raising Equal
Protection claims, and held that mental retardation is not a "quasi-suspect
classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is
normally accorded economic and social legislation."34 By doing so, the
Court highlighted the obvious social and constitutional concerns which mo-
tivated its conclusions:
First... those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to
cope with and function in the everyday world .... [T]hey range
from those whose disability is not immediately evident to those
who must be constantly cared for. They are thus different, immu-
tably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in dealing with
and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one. How this large
and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and
often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by
qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions
of the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substan-
tive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the classifica-
tion deals with mental retardation.
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the govern-
ment may legitimately take into account in a wide range of deci-
sions, and because both state and federal governments have
recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded, we will
not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disad-
vantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the
Constitution will not tolerate.35
Although the practical impact of the Court's decision respecting the con-
stitutional standard of review was to make it less likely that the judiciary will
be able to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, the majority
opinion makes it clear that "refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-
suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious dis-
34. Id. 105 S. Ct. at 3255-56 (1985). For a general discussion of these standards see supra
note 16.
35. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258 (footnotes omitted).
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crimination."' 16 The decision permits courts to focus on the reasons asserted
for the challenged unequal treatment and to analyze whether the discrimina-
tory policy is actually related to a legitimate state purpose. Having per-
formed such an analysis in Cleburne, there could be little doubt that the
reason for the discriminatory treatment was "the negative attitude of the
majority of the property owners located within 200 feet of the... facility, as
well as the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood." '37 In short: "an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." 8
A similar analytical form was employed in two other recently decided
cases: Alexander v. Choate , and Smith v. Robinson.' In Alexander v.
Choate, for example, the Court, in a unanimous decision, distinguished care-
fully among the types of civil rights law theories which would be applicable
in cases brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 4' and
held that since "discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the re-
sult of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus[,] ... much of the
conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act
would be difficult if not impossible to reach were [it] construed to proscribe
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.",
42
The effect of the ruling in Choate is to distinguish between the goal of
requiring equal rights for the disabled and providing services designed to
meet their special needs.43 Although the exact nature of needs which are
beyond the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of Section 504 re-
mains undefined, the facts in both Choate and Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis,' which was reaffirmed in Choate,45 do cast some light on this
question.
In Davis, the plaintiff was a student with a major hearing disability who
sought admission to a college training program for registered nurses. The
modifications she sought - full-time, personal supervision whenever she at-
tended patients, and elimination of all clinical courses - would have, in the
Court's view, "compromised the essential nature of the college's nursing
program" without providing her with the benefits she sought;46 for even
36. Id. at 3258.
37. Id. at 3259.
38. Id. at 3260.
39. 469 U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
40. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
42. 105 S. Ct. 712, 718-19.
43. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
44. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
45. 105 S. Ct. at 720-21.
46. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413-14 (1979).
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with the training and supervision, she would have been incapable of safely
performing her duties as a nurse.47 In Choate the issue was whether the
State of Tennessee could, in an attempt to reduce costs, lower the number of
days for which it would reimburse hospitals for services rendered to Medi-
caid patients per fiscal year from twenty to fourteen. The plaintiffs in Choate
argued that the reduction in benefits would have a far greater impact on the
handicapped than it would on those without disabilities, and that, given the
special needs of the disabled, the State should not be permitted to impose a
durational limitation at all.4" The Court rejected this contention, holding
that a facially neutral limitation on the amount of services available to both
handicapped and non-handicapped alike simply was not discriminatory, and
that Section 504 "does not require the State to alter [its] definition of the
benefit being offered simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have
greater medical needs.
' 49
Seen in context with Cleburne, the holding in Choate to the effect that
"[tihe balance struck ... requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the
grantee offers"5 ° means simply that the disabled must be offered at least the
same level of services as are offered to those without disabilities. Taken to-
gether with the holding in Davis that the handicapped individual must be
able to reap the intended benefit of the program or service offered, there can
be no doubt that, with respect to access to the most basic types of medical
care and treatment (such as food and water),5 ' the handicapped have the
47. Notably, the plaintiff in Davis would not have been capable of safely performing the
duties of a registered nurse even with full-time supervision. Id. at 403, 408 n.8; Choate, 105 S.
Ct. at 720.
48. The evidence in the district court showed that in the 1979-1980 fiscal year 27.4% of
all Medicaid-eligible handicapped users of hospital services required more than fourteen days
of care, while only 7.8% of non-handicapped users required services of the same duration.
Choate, 105 S. Ct. at 715. Although the district court had dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the disproportionate impact on the handicapped was "not the type of discrimina-
tion that § 504 was intended to proscribe[,]" a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had held that such evidence made out a prima facie violation of
Section 504. The State was therefore instructed to prove either that "alternative plans that
would achieve the State's legitimate cost-saving goals with a less disproportionate impact on
the handicapped" were unavailable, or "a substantial justification for the adoption of the plan
with the greater discriminatory impact." Id. at 716 & n.6 quoting both the decision of the
district court and the court of appeals in Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 881 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 715 F.2d 1036, 1045 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Alexander v. Choate,
105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
49. Choate, 105 S. Ct. at 722.
50. Id. at 721.
51. The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are
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same rights to equal treatment as those without disabilities.5 2
Dealing with Special Needs: Equality vs. Social Welfare
Because the disabled and the elderly, like the poor and others suffering
from social disadvantage or a legacy of past discrimination, often have spe-
cial needs not shared by the community at large, the legal standards applica-
ble to classifications which single them out for special treatment -
sometimes referred to as "affirmative action" 3 - designed to address their
needs have prompted a good deal of debate in the literature and in the cases.
The most recent case dealing with this issue in the context of disability
rights was Smith v. Robinson,54 a case in which the Supreme Court resolved
a dispute over the relationship among the Education of the Handicapped
Act,55 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,56 and the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5 7
Although the dispute in Smith centered on the question of whether attor-
ney's -fees were available under the various statutory and constitutional pro-
visions cited as a basis for the requirement that handicapped children be
provided "free appropriate public education",5 the case is important for the
entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's
program or benefit may have to be made.
Choate, 105 S. Ct. at 721 (footnote omitted).
The significance of this holding is that attempts to define the benefit in such a manner as to
justify depriving it from a disabled person must be looked at with a jaundiced eye. The stan-
dard is whether or not the disabled person can reap the same benefit as one who is able-bodied
or has a good prognosis for recovery. Food and water, whether administered by mouth or by
other means, perform the same function for the able-bodied as they do for the disabled: they
are the basic essentials of life. Thus, the test is not whether the substance administered will
"cure" the patient, but rather the function it performs, and whether that function is identical in
both cases. See supra text accompanying note 43. Compare infra text accompanying notes
164, 219-33.
52. See Choate, 105 S. Ct. at 721-25. In the other recent case involving the rights of the
disabled under Section 504, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631-34 (1984),
the Court ruled that any recipient of federal financial assistance, not just those who receive aid
designed to promote employment, is covered by the equality of treatment mandate of that
statute.
53. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3473 (1984) (citing Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1979)).
54. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
55. Education of the Handicapped Act §§ 601 et seq., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as E.H.A.].
56. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Education of the Handicapped Act §§ 601 et seq., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1982).
See generally Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 and specific regulations promulgated by the Department of
Education pursuant to the Act, 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(c)(3) (1985), 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977),
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distinctions it draws between the remedies available under the various con-
stitutional and statutory provisions which are available to protect the rights
of the disabled. In short, the Supreme Court held that where Congress en-
acts a comprehensive statutory program which is designed to accommodate
the rights and needs of the handicapped, it is inappropriate for the judiciary
either to substitute its own approach for protecting such rights under an
open-ended constitutional standard such as Equal Protection,59 or to stretch
the meaning of an overlapping provision such as Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973' beyond its goal of providing "equal access" to services
already provided to those without disabilities.61 The majority opinion does
make it clear, however, that where a state does provide "services beyond
those required [by Congress], but discriminatorily denie[s] those services to a
handicapped child, [Section] 504 would remain available... as an avenue of
relief."6 2
as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the fourteenth amendment, have
also been relied upon as independent bases for such a requirement. A thorough discussion of
the standards to be applied in cases where Congress has provided comprehensive enforcement
mechanisms for enforcement of private rights, but the parties assert their more general rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) is beyond the scope of this essay. See Middlesex County Sew-
erage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). The attorney's fees dispute
involved in Smith v. Robinson rests on that question and turns on a determination respecting
Congress' intent when it enacted the various laws which protect the disabled from discrimina-
tion and assure that they receive public services appropriate to their needs. The non-discrimi-
nation provisions contain authority for an award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party",
see Section 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(b) (Supp. 1985) (gov-
erning claims under Section 504); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (governing general civil rights and
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-85) (1982), but E.H.A., which guarantees both
the provision of services and the procedures to be followed by those seeking them, does not.
See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3465-74 (majority opinion), 3475 (Brennan, Marshall,
& Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (1984).
59. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. at 3472. Although the Court has held that there are
other means available to protect constitutional rights in the absence of an express grant of
statutory protection by Congress, see id. at 3469-70 n. 15, the primary method for doing so is
by lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-85 (1982) which authorize redress for denials of federal
constitutional and statutory rights.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
61. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. at 3473. The majority expressly disavowed any opinion
on the question of whether or to what extent Section 504 also confers a substantive right to
"free appropriate public education" similar or identical to that provided under E.H.A., but did
note that none of the parties to the case had made the "suggestion that § 504 adds anything to
petitioners' substantive right to a free appropriate public education," other than the possibility
that Section 504 could be used to circumvent E.H.A. administrative procedure and go directly
to court, and obtain damages and attorney's fees, neither of which are provided by that statute.
Id. at 3473-74 & nn.22-24.
62. Id. at 3473 n.22.
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Read together, Cleburne,63 Robinson," and Choate 65 stand for the propo-
sition that the disabled are entitled, at a minimum, to equal treatment at the
hands of government and those who receive federal funds whenever they
stand to receive the intended benefits of a program or activity offered to
those without disabilities. While inequities which do affect the disabled need
only be rationally related to the government's asserted purpose, the Court
will intervene whenever "an irrational prejudice", 66 rather than an attempt
to accommodate basic human needs, 67 is found to be the starting point for.
the legislative enactment. Taken at face value, the proposition would seem
to most observers to contain not only a fair and common-sense oriented ap-
proach to the rights of the disabled, but also a healthy respect for the limits
of judicial responsibility to correct perceived legislative shortcomings.6 The
difficulty, however, is that when courts are faced with what might be called
"hard cases"69 involving the elderly, incompetent or disabled there is a ten-
63. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3249
(1985).
64. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. at 3457.
65. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
66. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
67. Id. at 3259. See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. at 3470.
68. The debate over whether the Court should read remedial statutes such as E.H.A. as
broadly as possible, relying if necessary on other, more broadly phrased -statutory language
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), is beyond the scope of this paper. But the implicit assump-
tion of some judges and commentators to the effect that when the issue is arguably one which
does not expand the ambit of civil rights, the judiciary must retain ultimate and largely unfet-
tered control, see, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (1985) (Marshall, Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting); Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. at 3474, 3476-79
(Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 581,
599-604 (1984) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ. concurring and dissenting), seems, to this writer, to
go far beyond the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers which guarantees the demo-
cratic process. Thus, the question of whether the decision in Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) should be read to limit the authority
of courts to expand civil rights remedies in the face of what appear to be implicit, good-faith
limits on those remedies as was the situation in Smith and Choate; or whether the Court was
really bound in Grove City College v. Bell to apply the express, but more limited, "program or
activity" language written by Congress, rather than the far-broader administrative interpreta-
tion urged by some civil rights advocates, are not really "civil rights" issues in the traditional
sense at all. They are policy arguments which proceed from the assumption that judicial au-
thority can substitute for legislative action which cannot or will not change substantive legal
provisions deemed by the litigants or the court to be inadequate or archaic in light of the
perceived current needs of the legal system. See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Compare infra notes 102, 201-04 and accompanying text.
Such reasoning has the potential to erode even further the constitutional doctrines of separa-
tion of powers and federalism because it does so in the name of a "higher good" (civil rights).
For additional reflections on this topic as it relates to the current. controversy over alleged
limits on the power and duty of government to protect the disabled, the handicapped infant
and the defenseless elderly, see Part III and Conclusion.
69. See cases discussed infra notes 223, 227-29 and accompanying text. These may be
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dency to justify or, more commonly, to ignore both "irrational" and "ra-
tional ' 70 prejudice on moral, legal, ethical, and constitutional grounds.
That they are also beginning to do so in cases involving the interests of the
mentally retarded 71 is but a logical outgrowth of the reasoning process
employed.
II. WHOM SHOULD THE LAW PROTECT? OF PRINCIPLED OR
FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF THE LEGAL
CONCEPT OF "PERSON"
Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, America has witnessed a debate within aca-
demic and professional circles on the issue of whether legal policies gov-
erning bioethical questions should be governed by a "quality-of-life" ethic or
a "sanctity-of-life" ethic. 72 The debate is not a new one,73 but overt discus-
described as "hard cases" because they involve both judicial scrutiny of close medical ques-
tions, and judicial attempts to mesh the requirements of a legal system which is designed to
protect individual life with a developing ethic which holds death to be a humane alternative
when the prognosis is especially dim. See infra notes 216, 230, 246 and accompanying text.
70. "Rational" prejudice can be distinguished from "irrational" prejudice by reference to
the reasons stated by those affected by it. A visceral, but intense fear of racial minorities based
on little or no experience might be termed "irrational" and is probably the easiest to overcome.
Experience may prove it to be unfounded. "Rational" prejudice, on the other hand, is well
thought out: a matter of conscious judgment. Nazi hatred of Jews and Gypsies was, if any-
thing, coldly rational and pragmatic. It reflected the conscious choice of a subjective, utilita-
rian ethic which negated individual rights in order to "purify" the races. Its danger to society
lay in its cold-bloodedly rational rejection of the inherent equality of human persons, and its
assertion of a eugenically based societal right to eliminate those whose race, physical condition
or mental capacity was deemed to be inferior. See generally F. WERTHAM, A SIGN FOR CAIN:
AN EXPLORATION OF HUMAN VIOLENCE chs. 8, 9 (1966); W. BRENNAN, I MEDICAL HOLO-
CAUSTS chs. 2, 3 (1980).
71. See, e.g., In re Infant Doe, supra note 11.
72. One of the best early statements of the difference between the two ethical viewpoints
appeared in a 1970 editorial in California Medicine, the journal of the California Medical
Association. While it conceded that the "traditional Western ethic has always placed a great
emphasis on the intrinsic worth and equal value of every human life," it suggested that the
time was right for the adoption of a "new ethic" which would adopt a more relativistic ap-
proach toward the valuation of individual human lives. Editorial, A New Ethic for Medicine
and Society, CAL. MED., Sept., 1970, at 68. It also accurately noted that "[m]edicine's role
with respect to changing attitudes toward abortion will be a prototype of what is to occur."
Id. It went on to predict that "[o]ne may anticipate further developments of these roles as
problems of birth control and birth selection are extended, inevitably to death selection and
death control, whether by the individual or by society, and further public and professional
determination of when and when not to use scarce resources." Id. These views were echoed
13 years later in the context of what the California Medicine editorial called "death selection"
by Peter Singer, who wrote that "[t]he ethical outlook that holds human life to be sacrosanct
- I shall call it the 'sanctity-of-life view' - is under attack. The first major blow ... was the
spreading acceptance of abortion, and that [w]e can no longer base our ethics on the idea that
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sion of the issue in reported cases is of relatively recent vintage, and shows
that the process has reached the point where the academic and professional
debates have begun to influence the actual direction of public policy. That
rapid advances in medical technology have accelerated the process is obvi-
ous, but it was clearly under way in such traditional areas as abortion 74 and
euthanasia 75 long before the development of the advances in medical tech-
nology so often cited as current justification for a shift in our ethical
approach.76
The subject of this section, then, will be the ongoing process by which a
"quality-of-life" ethic is being adopted in place of the original natural rights
ethic which has governed American law since the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. It will be argued that the primary method being utilized by courts
and commentators to effect the change from the original natural rights/
"sanctity-of-life" ethic to one which rests upon the quality of a given life to
human beings are a special form of creation .... Id. Commentary, Sanctity of Life or Quality
of Life?, 72 Pediatrics 128 (July 1983).
The key to valuation of individual human life, in Singer's view, is that "we may continue to
see normal members of our species as possessing greater capacities of rationality, self-con-
sciousness, communication and so on, than members of any other species, but we will not
regard as sacrosanct the life of each and every member of our species, no matter how limited
its capacity for intelligent or even conscious life may be."
73. See generally D. Kevels, Annals of Eugenics: A Secular Faith, The New Yorker, Oct.
8, 1984, at 51 (Part I), Oct. 15, 1984, at 52 (Part II), Oct. 22, 1984, at 51 (Part III), Oct. 29,
1984, at 92 (Part IV).
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-50(4) (1963 & Supp. 1967), 1967 COLO. SESS.
LAWS Ch. 190 at § 284 (,permitting eugenic abortions); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227
A.2d 689 (1967) (rejecting the tort of "wrongful birth" based on the birth of a child with a
disability); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (1959) (permitting eugenic abortion). See generally
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS
(1975), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975) (partially codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301
(1976)); Symposium, The Report and Recommendations of the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Research on the Fetus,
22 VILL. L. REV. 297 (1977); Morrison, Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Quality of
and Right to Human Life, in Biomedical Ethics and the Law (J. Humber & R. Almeder eds.)
The current state of the law respecting these issues is discussed infra notes 139, 141, 249.
75. See, e.g., DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA (D. Horan and D. Mall eds. 1977); D.
HUMPHREY, LET ME DIE BEFORE I WAKE (1981); BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA (M. Kohl ed.
1975); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGE OF LIFE (1978); Sacred Congregation for the Doc-
trine of the Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia (Vatican City, May 5, 1980); Alexander, Medical
Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MED. 39 (1949); Rachels, Active and Passive
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975); Kamisar, Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-
Religious Objections, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958).
76. See generally J. LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY (1985); How BRAVE A NEW
WORLD? (R. MCCORMICK ed. 1981); Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment supra
note 8; Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental Medicine, 1
J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 47 (1985).
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society is a functional definition of what it means to be a human person. It
will begin with an analysis of constitutional and other legal sources, and
conclude with an argument for rejecting such "functional" definitions. As a
result, Part II will examine two distinct types of arguments: legal arguments
based on the present state of the law governing the rights of all individuals,
and legal policy arguments which are directed toward what the ethic gov-
erning the law affecting those who are helpless or disabled should be. 7
The distinction between "what is" and "what should be" in the law is
often a fine one. It is quite frequently overlooked in practice whenever there
are strong pressures for courts to reach a given result (i.e. "to do what is
right") even though the law as written may compel a different outcome.78
This is especially true in the American constitutional and common law tradi-
tions, where judges have taken for themselves the authority to adjust the
governing legal principles by continually restating "what the law is"' 79 on a
77. It has been argued that terms such as "'right to life' ... 'quality of life' and 'euthana-
sia' have been used in such conflicting ways that their meanings, if they ever were clear, have
become hopelessly blurred" and should be relegated to the status of "empty rhetoric", DECID-
ING TO FOREGO LIFE - SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 24-26. While it is true that
the terms may have different meanings to different persons, it is also clear that their meanings
are considerably sharpened when they are understood in terms of the ethical formulation of
the person using the term. Thus, they are by no stretch of the imagination "empty rhetoric"
when the ethic on which they are based is made clear. If, for example, the term "quality-of-
life" is used in a eugenic or functional sense, it carries a far different meaning than if it is used
in a social, environmental, or economic sense. Similarly, the term, "right to life" can scarcely
be described as "empty rhetoric" when the American Constitution and Declaration of Inde-
pendence explicitly mention it. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. It is the terms for which no
clear ethical referrent have been established, such as "right to die," or "right to privacy," or
"death-with-dignity" which can be classified as "empty rhetoric" unless and until their gov-
erning ethic is made clear. For a recent examination of the same problem with respect to the
definition of "equality" and "affirmative action" in the area of civil rights see generally Destro,
Equality, Social Welfare and Equal Protection, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1986).
78. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.l
(1983); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 599 (1984) (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., con-
curring and dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); id. at 522 (Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting);
id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Perhaps the most famous statement espousing this'position with respect to American
constitutional law was contained in a 1907 speech by the late Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is. .. "
Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907) reprinted in BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
864b (14th ed. 1968). On the question of judicial review in constitutional law, see generally
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (majority opinion per
Burger, C.J.) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803)). For a discussion of
the common law function of judicial review see, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) Compare Rees, Cathedrals Without Walls: A View from the
Outside (Book Review) 61 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1982); See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST (1980); E. LEVY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); L. LUSKY, BY
WHAT RIGHT? (1975). An extended discussion of the differences between the constitutional
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case-by-case basis. It will be argued that in situations where there is doubt
that judicial intervention is warranted on behalf of what the law arguably
"should be","° the ethic which governs the judicial approach from the outset
is the critical factor; for the incremental nature of the legal process itself
encourages the submission of new cases which will seem but a short step
from the last.
Thus in order to set the legal backdrop for a discussion of the impact that
"quality-of-life" arguments can have on the direction of existing law, Part I
of this essay focused on the constitutional and legal principles which pres-
ently govern the rights of the handicapped and aged to equal treatment
before the law. 8 It argued that these laws and principles are present legal
formulations which are binding on all segments of society, including courts,
until changed by approporiate means, and that they are rooted in a natural
rights ethic which condemns any "invidious" focus on disability, race, age,
sex, religion or national origin as irrelevant considerations in determining
the intrinsic worth of a human person. Part II will argue that "quality-of-
life" arguments, by contrast, are rooted in a functional ethic whose focus is
the worth of the individual as judged externally, by reference to what he or
she can do or contribute to the society in which they are a part; that such an
approach is inherently inconsistent with the legal principles identified in Part
I; and that its adoption will result in the gutting of the ethic on which those
principles rest.
and common-law traditions is beyond the scope of this essay. It should be noted, however,
that their fundamental difference lies in the fact that constitutions are "supreme law" which, in
theory, can only be changed in accordance with the provisions set out in the constitution itself.
See, e.g., U.S. CONS'r. art. V, art. VI, § 2. The common-law, on the other hand, is judge-made
and is subject to continuous revision at the hands of the judiciary which made it, and legisla-
tures are free either to accept, modify or reject it through codification of legislative policy.
80. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (opinion of Brennan,
Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ.) with id. at 691 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., and Burger C.J.,
concurring). The abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973) are a case in point. The cases are rarely, if ever, defended as appropriate
instances for the exercise of the power of judicial review as a matter of constitutional law, see,
e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, Thornburg v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Ep-
stein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name; The Abortion Cases, 1979 Sup. CT. REV.
159; in fact, most of the commentary defending them argues that they are correct as a matter
of public policy. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Bob Packwood, et al., Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1984), juris.
postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983) (refusing to consider their correctness as a matter of constitu-
tional law on grounds of stare decisis); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); id. at 337
(Marshal, J., dissenting).
81. See supra notes 18-68 and accompanying text.
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Examination of the cases demonstrates that quality-of-life arguments are
invariably put forth as the only "reasonable" solution to a hard case created
by a given medical prognosis or other set of medical circumstances. Because
such arguments derive their persuasive force from the uniquely difficult facts
of individual cases rather than from any argument that they are but the
logical extension of long-established and accepted legal principles,82 a "case-
by-case" approach to decision-making which accepts the quality-of-life ethic
as its starting point will inevitably have a negative incremental effect on ex-
isting law resting on a natural rights ethic. It does so by permitting excep-
tions to the general, "natural rights" rule which are based on quality-of-life
principles.
Given the importance of stare decisis to common-law and constitutional
policy-making, 3 the exception or extension of the law which was legiti-
mated by the decision in the prior case becomes the starting point for each
new case.8" The philosphy which motivated the creation of the prior excep-
tions from the original rule becomes the philosophical underpinning for the
development of new exceptions or modifications of the rule. Any attempt to
reimpose the original, pre-existing rule, or to limit the advance of the newly
established legal principle, is seen as a "step-backward" into an ethically or
82. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d. 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d. 647 (1976).
83. But see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983)
(noting that reliance on stare decisis is problematic in constitutional law when it is argued that
the prior decision is erroneous as a matter of law).
84. A linear review of the cases produces an extraordinarily clear illustration of this prin-
ciple. In the context of medical treatment for incompetents, In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976) dealt with the case of disconnecting a respirator supporting a comatose pa-
tient with a view towards letting nature take its course. Nine years later, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) which dealt with the
case of an incompetent patient who was not comatose, but in a waking "vegetative state." The
plea for relief in Conroy, however, was that nature needed to be "helped" by withdrawing food
and fluids. Death would then occur, not because of the patient's condition, but from dehydra-
tion and starvation. The Conroy case is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying
notes 153-83.
The same progression holds true with respect to abortion. When the Supreme Court de-
cided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) it claimed that its decision was limited in scope. By
1985, however, the holding had been expanded to the point where there were practically no
limitations on abortions whatever. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983) (striking second trimester restrictions approved in Roe); Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking fathers' and parents' rights);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1984),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (striking legislation protecting unborn children
after viability). More importantly, Roe was cited by one district court as justification for a
constitutional right of parents to refuse treatment for infants born with disabilities. American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 402-03 (D.D.C. 1983) (dictum).
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legally less desirable formulation of public policy.8 5
It is, therefore, critically important to distinguish between the demands of
existing law, which speaks with the force of present authority, and the con-
cerns of ethics (or ethicists) which speak to what "ought to be" as a matter
of correct behavior in a given case.16 Established laws are not the equivalent
of moral principles or ethical norms, although it is possible to make moral
and ethical arguments to support or attack them;87 they are legal rules
which bind both courts and citizenry unless and until changed through le-
gally permissible means.88 Ethical or moral arguments to the effect that
given legal rules should be changed to reflect a normative judgment other
than that reflected in current law will not suffice as a rationale for judicial
intervention on constitutional grounds to change existing policy. When seen
in their proper legal and constitutional context, arguments made by ethicists
in litigation challenging existing law on constitutional grounds beg the all-
important legal questions: "changed how, and by whom?". 9 They also miss
85. Compare, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. postponed, 105
S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (arguing that the theory of federalism--or, more properly, the rejection of
federalism---explicit in Roe should be rejected); and Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Gordon J.
Humphrey, et al., Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians and Gynecologists (arguing
that the Court's use of history and scientific theory in Roe was wrong and should be repudi-
ated) with Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Bob Packwood, et al. at 10, Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and Diamond v. Charles, No. 84 1379 (United
States Sup. Ct. pending) (arguing that since Roe v. Wade was "a natural outgrowth of a grad-
ual process of legal evolution" rejection of the theory on which the case is based "would not be
merely a restoration of the status quo ante but a revocation of the very principles from which
[it] sprang.... [It] would then be not just a significant step backwards, [citation omitted] but a
repudiation of the 50-year path along which this Court located its 1973 abortion ruling."
The same phenomenon has occurred in the context of affirmative action and equal protec-
tion. Notwithstanding its general rule that government-sponsored racial preferences are per se
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend that rule to government-sponsored racial prefer-
ences which are said to be "remedial" or "benign." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Setting aside the question
of whether a racial preference can ever be "benign," it seems clear from the cases that the
lower courts have translated the Court's unwillingness to take a principled stand against all
forms of racial discrimination as approving the concept that government-sponsored racial pref-
erences are permissible in the absence of a constitutional violation requiring a remedy for an
identifiable class of victims. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984), rev'g, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d
1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
86. Compare McCormick, Moral Argument and Christian Ethics, 1 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 3, 13-14, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Moral Argument and Chris-
tian Ethics].
87. Accord id. at 10-11.
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Compare Calabresi and Rees, supra note 79.
89. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).
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the central point from a lawyer's perspective: the existing rights of the indi-
vidual whose treatment is the subject of their ethical concerns. The rights of
this person alone - or more properly, the duty of those charged with his or
her care within the framework of a legal system which imposes on the State
the duty of providing equal treatment for each person, regardless of age or
handicap - should be the sole focus of the inquiry.'
Were the ethical arguments for a change in legal or constitutional stan-
dards to be made in legislative debates seeking statutory or constitutional
change, they would be correctly targeted. But given the persuasive force of
moral and ethical arguments and the desire of judges to reach the "just"
result, even if marginally inconsistent with established law,9 begging these
questions and missing the central point92 encourages a gradual erosion of
both the carefully crafted separation of powers which lies at the root of the
90. See supra text accompanying notes 14-68 and infra text accompanying notes 199-233.
91. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (arguable inconsis-
tency with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (argua-
ble inconsistency with equal protection component of fifth amendment Due Process Clause);
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (arguable inconsistency with
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(d) (1982)); United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3881 (U.S. 1985) (No. 84-1529) (arguable inconsistency with 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982) ); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (arguable inconsis-
tency with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27G-1 (West Supp. 1985-86)).
92. See MoralArgument and Christian Ethics, supra note 86, at 13 for an interesting criti-
cism of "poor moral arguments in contemporary discourse." Father McCormick states:
[P]oor arguments that are accepted not only establish nothing, they leave the resul-
tant conclusions entrenched. Both of these considerations are formidable obstacles to
the progress of Christian ethics. Most of the analyses that deserve the title "poor" or
"invalid" fit into either of two categories petitio principii (begging the question), or
ignorantia elenchi (missing the point). Clearly these failures very frequently overlap
and interpenetrate each other. That is, one who begs the question misses the point;
and one who misses the point begs the question.
The same criticism holds true for bad legal arguments which rely on the opinions of ethical
experts and argue for judicial change in existing law without reference to established policy
protecting the disabled. In this writer's judgment, Father McCormick comes perilously close
to violating his own strictures against begging the question and. missing the point when he
argues, among other things, that "it's very, very misleading language to face into these
problems in terms of nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap" because "[t]he question is
not whether quality of life ingredients play a part, but where we draw the line." UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING, PROTECTION OF HANDI-
CAPPED NEWBORNS 162 (June 13, 1985) (preliminary print). The point is that Congress has
already drawn the line by enacting both Section 504 and the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3) (West Supp. 1985), which set forth very clearly its view
that treatment "other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication" must be provided
in all cases except those where the child is chronically and irreversibly comatose, the treatment
would be futile in terms of survival due to its limited effectiveness, or inhumane. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5102(3) (A-C) (West Supp. 1985). Father McCormick apparently disagrees with this formu-
lation; for he would apparently authorize non-treatment of an infant afflicted with Tay-Sachs
Disease and a treatable, unrelated condition which threatens immediate death, such as duode-
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American constitutional system and the Equal Protection principle itself.93
nal atresia. See United States Commission on Civil Rights, supra at 143-44. Quoted in full,
Father McCormick's response to the hypothetical question was as follows:
COMMISSIONER MARY FRANCES BERRY. Father McCormick didn't get to
answer that question. Let him answer it first.
FR. McCORMICK. I'd be happy to let it go by if you want me to, but if you want
my opinion on that, I think it agrees more closely with Dr. Warren's statement. I
think we have here a gray area case where it could go either way. One could bring up
a persuasive reason on either side.
I do incline, however, to Dr. Fletcher's cautions that if you did want to suggest
treatment, you might be doing it largely in terms of drawing a line so you wouldn't
get into further abuses in other instances. But if you isolate the case on its own, you
could make a case either way.
Indeed, the most recent authoritative study on this matter by Robert Weir puts
Tay-Sachs in the case of withholding or withdrawing treatment.
Id. at 144.
The comments of Dr. Mary Ann Warren and Dr. John Fletcher to which he refers are as
follows:
DR. WARREN. I believe that the hypothetical case you describe, a Tay-Sachs
child who also has a condition which threatens to cause immediate death, is a case
which falls within the gray area, and it could be rationally argued that the treatment
should be performed or that it should not. And therefore, this is the sort of case in
which a decision should be made primarily by the parents with the best medical
counsel and with the help of whatever other counselors they may wish to avail them-
selves of.
Id.
DR. FLETCHER. If I were asked for an opinion in the case, I would recommend
that surgery be done because the Tay-Sachs child will have several months of almost
normal life, that is, could live a few months before he or she begins to decline and
eventually die by 3 or 4 years old. I think you're correct about the age.
The reasoning I would use for that is that there are too many other cases where
you could use the same reasoning in order to justify ending the life of a newborn with
a similar degree of handicap by avoiding surgery.
So if you're asking me to comment on that hypothetical case, I could not recom-
mend passivity.
Id.
93. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d. 144, 163 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) ("A judicial failure to follow the analogy [to race discrimination in cases arising
under the laws protecting the handicapped] where it leads is an outright disagreement with
Congress' judgment and an unconstitutional act in itself."). See generally sources cited supra
notes 79, 92 and infra note 251.
This point should be distinguished from arguments which rely on federalism to urge that
Congress should not interfere with parental or medical judgments concerning the disposition
of disabled infants. See, eg., Brief Amicus Curiae of George P. Smith II at 15-21, Heckler v.
American Hosp. Ass'n, cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985). Such arguments neglect not only
the authority of Congress to condition receipt of federal funds on adherence to the require-
ments of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), and the Fed-
eral Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-02 (1982), but also the
fact that it was the state courts themselves which approved the denial of necessary treatment
notwithstanding state laws prohibiting medical neglect. See, e.g., Infant Doe v. Bloomington
Hosp., supra note 11. More importantly, they beg the question. See supra note 92 and infra
text accompanying notes 244-51.
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It does so by granting the judiciary an immense power: the power to alter
fundamental legal notions of the "proper" treatment of the helpless, the
aged, and the mentally or physically disabled94 by redefining the most funda-
mental legal right of all - the right to legal protection for one's own life,9 5
and by permitting judges to make the ultimate determination of who shall be
counted by the law as having the rights of a human person in the first
place.
96
A. The Problem of Definition
There are few places in the law where the convergence of ethical and legal
argument are so intertwined as in the realm of bioethics,97 and even fewer
which so often merge the divergent goals of common law and constitutional
law forms of judicial review.9" One need only survey a sampling of recent
94. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255-60
(1985). See generally supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
95. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the right
to life is the "right to have rights").
96. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), makes it clear that having the status of "person" is
essential if the state is to exercise its power and duty to protect the individual's life, liberty or
property. Id. at 156-58 (noting that were the unborn to be considered persons within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment the asserted right to privacy on which the Court relied
to rest the right to abortion would "collapse"). See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25 (1946) in
which the Court refused to consider the argument that the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal
had violated Yamashita's rights as a "person" to due process. In dissent, Justice Rutledge
noted the dangers of restricting the coverage of the term:
I am completely unable to accept or to understand the Court's ruling Eon this issue].
Not heretofore has it been held than any human being is beyond its universally pro-
tecting spread .... That door is dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it.
For once it is ajar, even for eneAy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for
others, perhaps ultimately for all.
Id. at 78-79. See also Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886) (holding, without argument, that a corporation is a "person" under the fourteenth
amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885) ("Constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.").
97. Two others, both relevant to the present discussion, are family law and religious free-
dom questions. See generally Destro, The Family and Public Policy in THE POPE JOHN XXIII
MEDICAL-MORAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, THE FAMILY TODAY AND To-
MORROW 113-29 (1985). [hereinafter cited as The Family and Public Policy].
98. Common law judicial review is aimed at adapting specific judge-made legal principles
for which there are no legislative rules to apply to new, but similar, fact-patterns. See generally
Calabresi, supra note 79, at 90-145. Such changes are subject to immediate revision of the
judicial approach through legislative policy-making. Constitutional forms of judicial review,
however, are different: their aim is to restrict the unconstitutional exercise of power, not to
revise laws thought to be outdated or out-of-step with contemporary needs. The difficulty, of
course, is the contemporary problem of "expanding" notions of constitutional rights, and the
impact they inevitably will have on legislative determinations with respect to the proper priori-
ties of public policy. See supra note 79. Compare sources cited infra notes 139, 141, 249 with
Heckman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., No. 84-15376 (4th Dist., Hennepin Cty., Minn. August
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literature on the topic to appreciate that the process is a dynamic one driven
by advances in medical technology and developments in ethics which urge a
more open, judgment-oriented approach.99 Nonetheless, far too little atten-
tion has been paid to the process by which the law is opened to such
change."°° The immediate need to resolve bioethical/legal controversies ex-
peditiously often diverts attention from the nature of the legal process and
the significant impact that the process of incremental modification -
brought about by a modified "case-by-case" approach which relies on stare
decisis' 01 - has on the vitality of basic legal principles."0 2
Once again, the proper place to begin this discussion of the method by
which gradual modification of constitutional principle is accomplished is
section one of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. 10 3 The relevant provision in this context is the Due Process Clause:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law", for it governs attempts by the states" to limit or other-
wise restrict the rights of "any person" to "life, liberty or property". The
operative legal terms are "any person", "life" and "liberty". The most effec-
tive means for gradually eroding the ethic protected by their original mean-
15, 1985) (order granting summary judgment) (holding that Minnesota's statutory ban on
"wrongful birth" cases, MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1984) is unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
99. See generally DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT supra note 8.
100. See sources cited supra note 79.
101. Much has been said in this regard concerning the desirability of a "case-by-case" ap-
proach. Given that each case has a unique set of facts, such an approach is to be commended.
The cases which are discussed in this essay, however, do not fit the "case-by-case" model;
rather they are best described as adopting a "modified" case-by-case approach.
In a true "case-by-case" approach each case would rest on its own footing and would refer
directly to the basic constitutional and ethical principles which govern such cases, not to the
principles of prior cases involving similar facts. Prior cases would be useful as a guide, but
would not compel a given result. This is the preferred approach in constitutional law and is
the basis of Justice Powell's statement in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983), that stare decisis is problematic when the issue is one of constitutional inter-
pretation. Id. at 420 n. 1.
102. Whether the process is described as a "slippery slope" or in some other fashion which
conveys the concept of a gradual disintegration of a concept or value once clear in the law is
not particularly important. It is the process and its inevitable results which concern me here.
For an illustration of this process as it relates to the expansion of the legal definition of "fam-
ily" see Destro, supra note 97, at 116 & n. 16. An example in the context of bioethics is con-
tained in the discussion of the rights of a live "fetus ex utero" (a premature infant) born after
abortion and fetal experimentation. See sources cited supra note 74.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. The federal government is bound by the strictures of the Due Process Clause of the
fifth amendment, which have been interpreted as imposing virtually identical substantive
prohibitions on the power of government at the state and federal levels. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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ing has been to obtain their re-definition. The terms remain the same, but
their substance reflects the "new" ethic rather than the original one."
Analysis of recently decided or currently pending cases involving handi-
capped newborns and incompetent adults shows that the gradual acceptance
of "quality-of-life" reasoning by the judiciary follows precisely this pattern.
The constitutional and common law analysis employed by many of these
courts is one which is clearly sympathetic to the application of quality-of-life
standards, but it is insufficiently brave to state simply that the incompetent
subject is just not fit to live." °6 Thus, advocates for a quality-of-life ap-
proach content themselves with legal arguments having little (on the surface)
to do with the new ethic, and courts, which are required to decide only the
cases before them, °7 decide them on those grounds. 108
The quality-of-life arguments made in these cases generally turn on either
of two possible legal approaches: judicial expansion of the "liberty" (self-
105. See infra text accompanying notes 124-39.
106. See infra notes 111-20, 165-98, 239-49 and accompanying text.
107. See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1625-1705 (5th ed. 1980). Rules governing state court authority to issue advisory opinions
differ from state to state.
108. A good example of this tendency in another context is Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), in which opponents of laws restricting the ability of unmarried persons to obtain
birth control devices argued that "equal protection of the laws" forbade differential treatment
of married and unmarried persons. Equality was the asserted rationale used by the Court to
negate important legal distinctions between those who are married and those who are not,
notwithstanding the fact that the two classes of individuals are not similarly situated for legal
purposes, but the true rationale for the decision was judicial disapproval of the substantive
legislative policy which restricted the access of unmarried persons to birth control devices or
services. Although that substantive legislative judgment may be unwise or incorrect as a mat-
ter of public policy, the judicial rationale which invalidated it had little to do with "equality".
That such judicial disingenuity has ramifications in future cases was illustrated during the
current term of the United States Supreme Court. In a brief criticizing the Solicitor General
Charles Fried's citation of Eisenstadt as an "equal protection" case, Professor Laurence Tribe
of the Harvard Law School has written: "Virtually every commentator on the case, including
the very authors the Government cites in its brief (citation omitted), has recognized that (Ei-
senstadt v. ] Baird cannot be defended in standard "equal protection" terms but rests unavoid-
ably on the premise that there exists a special freedom to obtain and use contraceptives-a
freedom that goes beyond the marital relationship and the privacy of the home." Brief Amicus
Curiae of Senator Bob Packwood, et al., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). Professor
Tribe's comments underscore the point made here: that an open-ended "ethic" or "principle"
will permit the judiciary to define substantive disagreements with legislative will in whatever
fashion is necessary to give them an asserted justification for striking the pre-existing policy in
favor of the alternative they prefer. Once the original policy has been gutted, it is then appar-
ently considered to be bad form to take the Court's words concerning the governing principle
at face value. The lesson, of course, is that the true importance of a case does not rest upon
what the Court says it is doing, but upon an analysis of the legal justification, if any, for what it
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determination) interest protected by the Due Process Clause and the com-
mon law; or limitation of the class of persons covered by presently existing
law governing the right of the disabled and handicapped to equal treat-
ment."° In either case the forseeable and intended result is the same: the
class of "persons" protected by the law is defined functionally - by what an
individual can do or feel, rather than by reference to their nature: that is,
what they are."0
When the rationale in such cases is non-constitutional or a mixture of
common-law and constitutional analysis, as is often the case where an in-
competent adult is the subject of the proceeding, the touchstone is a form of
individual liberty which is said to be exercised by proxy."' In cases where
the subject is a seriously ill or handicapped child or infant, however, an
individual liberty or "self-determination" rationale would be far too trans-
parent a fiction for most courts. In these cases, a quality-of-life ethic is sim-
ply infused into the traditional standard in juvenile medical neglect cases,
"the 'best interests of the child," 2 and the means for implementing it is vir-
tually identical to that employed in the case of abortion: a liberty-based "pri-
109. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub
nom Heckler v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 53 U.S.L.W. 3881 (U.S. 1985) (No. 84-1529) (restric-
tive interpretation of existing law); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp.
395 (D.D.C. 1983) (same, with additional reliance on "privacy" concerns); Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (common law self-determination, power of the state as parens pa-
triae for incompetents).
110. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (concept of "meaningful" life). See
also sources cited infra notes 166, 182.
111. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The reliance placed on
third party "exercise" of the patient's rights is a fiction when there is no convincing evidence of
the patient's desires, a fact recognized in the Conroy dissent. See id. at 389, 486 A.2d at 1246
(Handler, J., dissenting). The real issue in "food and water" cases such as Conroy is whether
death by dehydration or starvation may be authorized by a surrogate. In Conroy, the New
Jersey court answered the question in the affirmative. The fallacy of this reasoning, however,
is that in the rare instance when a competent individual sought judicial acquiescence in their
own death by the same means, permission was denied. In Re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d
93 (1984); California Court Rebuffs Appeal of Quadraplegic, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1983, at
A16, col. 6 (ate city ed.). In one recent case, however, a California Appeals Court upheld
Elizabeth Bouvia's right not to be force-fed by a nasogastric tube. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986,
A26, col. 1. The hospital intends to appeal the decision. Id.
Thus the real purpose of the decision is to allow the surrogate-or the state as parens pa-
triae-to make an independent judgment on behalf of the incompetent that his or her life is no
longer worth supporting. See 7A ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1985) (permitting ma-
jority vote of children for a parent and third-party execution of "living will" permitting with-
drawal of treatment for a minor or incompetent).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (1978); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2101 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West 1982); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 412 (McKinney 1983).
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vacy" right of the parents' 13 to make whatever medical decisions they
consider to be in the "best interests" of themselves and their child.1 14  And
this is so even where the decision is based on an explicit statement that the
child "would be better off dead."'
' 15
113. Compare, e.g., Fletcher, Fetal Research: An Ethical Appraisal in NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUS: APPENDIX 3-13 (1976).
114. An extended discussion of the scope of parental rights to determine the nature and
extent of treatment when a minor child is alleged to be in need of medical care is beyond the
scope of this essay, but the topic should be noted in passing due to the reliance of courts and
commentators on an asserted parental "privacy" right to be free of government intervention in
cases involving difficult medical care decisions. Examination of the cases demonstrates that
the courts will not hesitate to intervene in family affairs whenever they determine that a child
is in need of treatment, even in the face of a parental claim that they have a constitutional right
to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Matter in Appeal In Cochise County, 133 Ariz. 157, 650 P.2d
459 (1982) (en banc); People in the Interest of D.L.E., 200 Colo. 244, 614 P.2d 873 (Colo.
1980) (en banc) (D.L.E. I); People in the Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (1982) (en banc)
(D.L.E. II) (same case, one year later); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952) (religious objections); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d
518 (1974) (same); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 865, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970), affid,
37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (same).
Since the issue is framed as one involving alleged parental neglect, sincere parental concern
and affection for the child are not controlling. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 470, 181 A.2d
751, 759 (1962). Some of the major factors to be considered are: the effect of non-treatment
either on the child's chance for life or on his emotional or psychological well-being; the benefits
to be derived from the proposed treatment; the risks and potential side effects of proposed
treatment plans; medical testimony as to the propriety of the proposed course of action; the
child's preference where available; the effect of a delay in implementation of a proposed course
of action; and whether or not an emergency exists or whether there is an imminent danger to
the child's life. Id. at 476, 181 A.2d at 754; Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d
769, 773 (1952); In re Hofbauer, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (1978), afl'd, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936
(1979); Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836, 844 (1979) (Custody II); In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972). See In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 568, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affid, 37 A.D. 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), afl'd,
278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). See also, e.g., Comment, The Outer Limits of Pa-
rental Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treatment from Children, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 813
(1981); Comment, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Under What Circumstances Does
It Exist?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 607 (1980); Comment, Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980). Recent case law indicates that in certain
instances the parents may have no rights at all if the court deems it necessary to exclude them
altogether from the decision-making process. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating statute granting parents notice prior to judicial au-
thorization of abortion on an immature minor). It is, therefore, rather anomalous for courts
and commentators to rely on an asserted parental right to privacy to refuse medical treatment
when the child is handicapped. See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F.
Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983); Brief Amicus Curiae of George P. Smith, II at 21-26, Heckler
v. American Hosp. Ass'n, (unreported) (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
To do so is to confuse what the law is (i.e., courts will intervene as a matter of course with
what such advocates think it should be or that parents should have unfettered discretion when
the child is disabled).
115. Destro & Moeller, Necessary Care for the Retarded Child. The Case of Phillip Becker,
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The result is that a handicapped infant will not be considered to be fully
human until his parents accept him as such' I 6 or until the state demon-
strates that the child will be functional.1 7 Until that time, the child has no
rights of its own which are independently enforceable by the state,' "8 even
those which are expressly designed to protect his or her rights as a handi-
capped person. " 9 In the case of incompetent adults, the assumption appears
to be that they have lost the functional qualities which make them "human."
If they, or a "reasonable person" in their situation, would prefer death to
their present state of health or incompetence, it is argued that society has no
further duty to protect them from legal harm.'20
. The Concept of Functional Definition: What is a "Person"
for Legal Purposes?
There are two possible ways to define the legally operative term "person":
first, by reference to the inherent human nature of the individual (i.e., based
on the genetic complement which distinguishes humans from other animals);
or second, by reference to qualities the law considers to be necessary for legal
4 Hum. LIFE REV. 81 (1980) [quoting Transcript of Record]; In re Phillip B., A Minor, No.
66103 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Cal. Apr. 27, 1978), aff'd, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156
Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 749 (1980).
116. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117: See cases cited infra at note 119. See generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS, PROTECTON OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (June
12-13, 1985).
118. See notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
119. 'See supra text accompanying notes 18-68 and infra text accompanying notes 199-233.
This issue is raised most clearly in American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, No. - (2d Cir. 1984,
unreported), aff'g, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) relying on United States v. University
Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), affig, 575 F. Supp. 607 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)), which held,
over the objection of the federal government, that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), had no application to treatment decisions made on behalf of
handicapped newborns, and that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices had no authority to issue regulations which would apply Section 504 in this manner. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in American Hosp. Ass'n and will decide the applicability
of Section 504 to handicapped newborns during the Fall, 1985 Term. Heckler v. American
Hosp. Ass'n (unreported) (2d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985). In June, 1985
the United States Commission on Civil Rights held hearings into the application of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), to handicapped newborns, and its
report and the transcript of its hearings should be published before the end of 1986. See supra
notes 11, 92. See also Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1984).
120. Accord DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 136.
The critical point is that the incompetent patient is not dead, but in a "vegetative" state. See
infra note 244 and accompanying text. The issue, therefore, is not simply whether the individ-
ual should be permitted to die as a result of disease or disability, but whether the existence or
extent of disease or disability is sufficient to justify active steps which are intended to cause
death-such as withdrawal of food or fluids-and which would not be tolerated in other cases.
See supra note 84 and infra text accompanying notes 164, 244.
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protection of an individual personality (i.e., based on those qualities which
are alleged to be unique to human function and which are valued in the
community). The first approach is unquestionably the basis of a natural




Under a natural rights approach, one need only be genetically human to
be entitled to the equal protection afforded all "persons" by the law. Such a
standard does not rest on the assent of the state; for the state is not the
power which confers either the human nature or the "unalienable rights"
which come with it. 12 2 The duty of the state and others is to respect and to
protect those rights against all who would violate them without due process
of law. 123 As Thomas Jefferson put it in 1809, "[t]he care of human life and
happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of
good government."'
124
This view finds expression in the natural rights language of the American
Declaration of Independence, which states the belief of its authors that the
ethic which holds "that all men are created equal and that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" is "self-evident" truth.'
The exhortations of John Bingham, the author of section one of the four-
teenth amendment, also reflect the natural rights ethic. His view, declared
on the floor of the United States House of Representatives during the 1867
debates over the fourteenth amendment, was that "the only question to be
asked of the creature claiming [the amendment's] protection is this: Is he a
man?". 1
26
The view that an individual should not be considered to be a person unless
it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the state that he or she is func-
tionally human is best summarized by the the views of the Austrian scholar
121. Accord DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT see supra note 8, at
135 n.43.
[The phrase] quality-of-life has been used in differing ways; sometimes it refers to the
value that the continuation of life has for the patient, and other times to the value
that others find in the continuation of the patient's life, perhaps in terms of their
estimates of the patient's actual or potential productivity or social contribution....
122. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1875):
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the
control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the
lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute
disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is
after all but a despotism.
123. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 166-248 (1978).
124. Speech to the Republican Citizens of Washington County, Maryland (March 31,
1809), reprinted in 1. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, 472-73 (14th ed. 1968).
125. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
126. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1867).
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Hans Kelsen. Professor John Noonan has described Kelsen's jurisprudential
views on the issue as follows:
In Kelsen's view, the legal order is the source of all legal rights,
and a 'person' is merely the personification of such legal rights. In
his words, 'The physical (natural) person is, thus, no natural real-
ity but a construction of juristic thinking.' If the legal order does
not recognize any rights in a human being, such a human being is
not a person.
12 7
Kelsen's view of the functional nature of the human person also finds sup-
port in American law. Perhaps the best example of such reasoning is that
which motivated the American South's "peculiar institution": Slavery.
Chief Justice Roger Taney's words for the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v.
Sanford 128 are the essence of an ethic which exalts function over nature in
order to determine who shall have rights:
They [persons of Black African descent] had for more than a cen-
tury before been regarded as beings of an inferior order; and alto-
gether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slav6ry for his benefit. 'He
was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of mer-
chandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it....
[They] were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and
when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were sup-
posed to need protection." 129
By the time the Court decided Dred Scott, however, the policy of some states
had begun to accept a natural rights ethic. No matter. The use of a func-
tional ethic was, in Taney's view, part and parcel of constitutional adjudica-
tion itself. Whatever change in attitude had prompted some states to
127. J. NOONAN JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE 13-14 (1979) (quoting F. KELSEN, THE PURE
THEORY OF LAW 94-95 (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1967).
The New York Court of Appeals adopted Kelsen's line of reasoning in Byrn v. New York
City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 200-01, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390-
91 (1972):
What is a legal person is for the law ... to say, which simply means that upon
according legal personality to a thing the law affords it the rights and privileges of a
legal person .... That the legislative action may be wise or unwise, even unjust and
violative of principles beyond the law, does not change the legal issue or how it is to
be resolved. The point is that it is a policy determination whether legal personality
should attach and not a question of biological or "natural" correspondence.
But see Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (rejecting the "legal" -
"biological" distinction).
128. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
129. Id. at 407, 410.
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disallow slavery, he wrote, had nothing to do with the human nature of
Blacks: the reason for legal change was purely functional. "[I]t was discov-
ered, from experience," wrote the Chief Justice, "that slave labor was un-
suited to the climate and productions of these States."' 30
Even though the debates over section one of the fourteenth amend-
ment, "' including the impassioned speeches of its author,"a2 should make it
abundantly clear that the amendment is based on a natural rights view of the
inherent worth of the human person, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to
write its own quality-of-life/functional ethic into the cases whenever its own
prejudices seemed to call for it. In Buck v. Bell, 3 for example, the Supreme
Court held that a woman committed to a state mental institution may be
sterilized to prevent her bearing retarded children. The functional approach
of a quality-of-life rationale is explicit.
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
130. Id. at 412.
131. For a discussion of the history of the fourteenth amendment as it relates to the obliga-
tion of government to protect the lives of individuals see The Need for a Life-Protective Amend-
ment, supra note 7, at 1288-90 & nn.190-209.
132. See, e.g., Address by Congressman John A. Bingham, Bowerstown, Ohio, August 24,
1866, printed in Cincinnati Commercial, August 27, 1866, at 1, col. 3:
[The amendment] imposes a limitation upon the States to correct their abuses of
power, . . . Look at that simple proposition. No State shall deny to any person, no
matter whence he comes, or how poor, how weak, how simple - how friendless -
no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.... That proposition, I think, my fellow citizens, needs no argument. No man
can look his fellow-man in the face, surrounded by this clear light of heaven in which
we live and dare to utter the proposition that of right any State in the Union should
deny to any human being who behaves himself well the equal protection of the laws.
Paralysis ought to strangle the tongue before a man should be guilty of the blas-
phemy that he himself to the exclusion of his fellow man, should enjoy the protection
of the laws.
Accord remarks of Congressman John A. Bingham, House of Representatives, Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866):
If a State has not the right to deny equal protection to every human being under the
Constitution of this country in the rights of life, liberty, and property, how can State
rights be impaired by penal prohibitions of such denial as proposed?
For a present-day argument that federalism concerns should lead the Supreme Court to permit
the states to utilize quality-of-life approaches in their construction of child-neglect statutes, see
Brief Amicus Curiae of George P. Smith II, Heckler v. American Hosp. Ass'n (unreported)
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985), arguing that federalism and parental
rights can be cited as a possible rationale for rejecting federal protection for handicapped in-
fants. For a review of the remarks of other sponsors of the fourteenth amendment, including
the Senate floor leader, Senator Jacob M. Howard, and Representatives Thaddeus Stevens and
Edgar Cowan, see The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, supra note 7, at 1332 & nn.399-
400.
133. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, soci-
ety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.'
34
Justice Holmes' position in Buck v. Bell is relevant to the present inquiry
for both its explicit adoption of a functional approach to questions of entitle-
ment to basic human rights, and its implicit assumptions about the role of
government in the process. Notably, it has never been overruled.135 It as-
sumes, among other things, 1) that certain individuals may be described as
"manifestly unfit"; 2) that government may decide when individuals are in
accordance with a quality-of-life formula; 3) that those who are "manifestly
unfit" because of a disability do not have the same rights to equal protection
under law as others; and 4) that the result consistent with the quality-of-life
formulation is "best" for all the world, even though "not often felt to be such
by those [who are declared to be unfit and who are immediately] concerned."
Careful examination of cases adopting a functional approach reveals that
each one rests on some formulation of the same elements, and each, in its
own way, reaches the same result.
The most recent explict acceptance of a functional ethic of human rights
by the Supreme Court came in Roe v. Wade.'36 In Roe, the Court espoused
the view that the unborn offspring of human parents, a human fetus, must be
capable of "meaningful life' ' 137 outside the womb before he or she can be can
be considered as having anything more than the "potential" for human
life. 138 Genetic identity is, under this formulation, irrelevant, except to de-
termine "potential" for human life. But this "potential", standing alone, is,
in the Court's view, insufficient to permit legal recognition of the unborn
134. Id. at 203.
135. The late Justice William 0. Douglas cited Buck v. Bell with approval in support of his
position that the state has power to protect its interests against "hereditary forms of insanity or
imbecility" in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court explicitly validated the eugenic rationale of Buck v.
Bell when it found that the statute was invalid because, unlike the one in Bell, it gave "the
defendant no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable parent of
socially undesireable offspring." Id. at 538. Justice Stone's concurring opinion makes it clear
that the "Court has sustained such an experiment [sterilization] with respect to an imbecile, a
person with a definite and observable characteristic, where the condition had persisted through
three generations and afforded grounds for the belief that it was transmissible and would con-
tinue to manifest itself in generations to come." Id. at 546.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. Id. at 163.
138. Id. at 150, 164-65.
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offspring of human parents as a "person" under the fourteenth amendment.
More - "meaningful life" - is required.
Since Roe, the development of this "meaningful life" standard has devel-
oped in logical progression as hard case follows and builds upon hard case,
each raising different permutations of the same question: when does a life
which is genetically human have "meaning" for its own sake (intrinsic mean-
ing) and for others (extrinsic meaning)? In this fashion the quality-of-life
ethic which holds that "lives without meaning" are without value under the
law has expanded to the point where courts have held that the birth of a
handicapped child can support a damage claim against a physician,' 39 and
that prenatal eugenic selection of children is a matter of constitutional right
which cannot be infringed by either the physician or the state. 140 One court
has even gone so far as to hold that a parent who takes no action to prevent
the birth of a child with incurable handicaps might be liable to the child
under a theory of "wrongful life",' 4 ' apparently because it would be con-
demned to a life "without meaning". And so the law based on the functional
ethic expands, driven inexorably by the press of new cases and the stare
decisis effect of the first principles and ethics upon which it is based.' 42
C. Accepting the Functional Definition: Recent Case Law Involving
Handicapped Infants and the Elderly
That precisely this sort of quality-of-life reasoning is gaining acceptance in
139. In a wrongful birth action the claim is based on the assertion that the physician negli-
gently failed to inform the parents of a significant risk that the child might be born with
defects. A closely related theory is "wrongful pregnancy", where it is alleged that the defend-
ant negligently performed a sterilization operation or negligently supplied contraceptives. See
cases cited infra note 249. See also Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., No. 84-15376 (4th
Dist., Hennepin City, Minn. Aug. 15, 1985) (order granting summary judgment). In Hickman
a Minnesota district court ruled that the state statute which prohibited wrongful birth actions
was unconstitutional in that it allegedly interfered with a woman's rights under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., No. 84-15376, slip. op. at 13 (4th Dist. Henne-
pin County, Minn. Aug. 15, 1985).
141. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 (Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980). A "wrongful life" case is an action brought on behalf of the child for injuries suffered
from an alleged negligent failure to prevent its birth. Every jurisdiction which has considered
the issue, except for the decision of one intermediate Court of Appeal in California, has held
that no such cause of action exists. e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Turpin v.
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Becker v. Schwartz, 47
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.
2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). Curlender's
"wrongful life" theory was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Turpin v. Sortini.
Its holding that parents might be held liable was negated by amendment of the California Civil
Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
142. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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the law governing the rights of the handicapped and elderly cannot be
doubted. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,'43 for example,
Judge Gerhard Gesell explicitly held that before the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services could promulgate regulations under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 to protect handicapped
newborns from non-treatment decisions which would likely lead to death, it
was required to take into account "the quality of the infant's expected
life"' 45 and the potential for adverse "economic, emotional and marital ef-
fects on the family as a whole" due to "the effort to preserve an unwanted
child". t46 Notably, the court relied expressly on Roe v. Wade for the propo-
sition that parents may have a privacy right to demand that the government
refrain from interfering with quality-of-life judgments which may result in
the death of their child from lack of treatment or nourishment.'
47
Thus begins the two-pronged process of re-defining the pre-existing legal
rights of the person whose life is at stake: in this case, a handicapped new-
born child. 4 ' The starting point is the acceptance of the functional ethic in
143. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The requirements of Section 504 are discussed at length in
Part I, supra text accompanying notes 39-68.
145. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 403 (dictum).
148. Judge Gesell did not cite any case which held that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) did not apply to handicapped newborns. Instead, he
invalidated the regulations on the ground that the Department of Health and Human Services
had acted improperly when it enacted the so-called "Baby Doe" rules as "interim final rules"
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553(b)(d), 706(2)(A) (1982). None-
theless, it is quite clear that the thrust of his opinion is that Section 504 was not intended to
apply to all handicapped newborns, notwithstanding its broad requirement that "[n]o other-
wise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excused
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Although the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit felt that Judge Gesell had "reasoned that the interim final
rule could not properly be viewed as a restatement of pre-existing law or policy, as the govern-
ment had alleged," United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1984), it is
clear from the opinion in Heckler that pre-existing law was not given a broad interpretation
because of the quality-of-life dimensions of the issues at bar. Judge Gesell wrote:
The legislative history of [Section 504] focuses on discrimination against adults and
older children and denial of access to federal programs, As far as can be determined,
no congressional committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested
that section 504 would be used to monitor medical treatment of defective newborn
infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life .... On the
other hand, the statute on its face is open to a broad and all-inclusive iriterpreta-
tion.... While the term "infant" in the regulation is not defined, at least some infants
born with physical and mental defects may well fit within that broad definition.
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 401-02. The import of such
reasoning for the future development of the law is clear. In at least one court's opinion, Con-
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Roe, and the once-clear dividing line between born and unborn falls to the
relentless logic of an expanding first principle that life must have function
and meaning in order to warrant legal protection. Thus, the first inquiry is
"the quality of the [child's] expected life"' 4 9 and impact that that life will
have on others.15 ° The second is an inquiry into whether the court should
hold that the "competing interests at stake" require a limitation on or excep-
tion to the power of government to regulate on the basis of the pre-existing
natural rights ethic.' 5 ' And, the last is reliance on the claim that the "pri-
gress must speak affirmatively before the quality-of-life ethic preferred by the judiciary can be
supplanted by a legislative one which would include all handicapped infants, and even then,
the result may well be overridden by the courts' view that the constitutional "right to privacy"
includes the right of parents to make medical decisions based on a quality-of-life ethic. This
conclusion is buttressed by the overt narrowing of a term in the regulations which, the court
points out, is undefined: "infant". Precisely why an explicit definition for such an obvious
term would be necessary given its "plain English" meaning - a baby - is unclear. But
Judge Gesell provides the answer by limiting the term "infant" to reflect the quality-of-life
ethic position that not all persons deserve legal protection: "While the term 'infant' in the
regulation is not defined, at least some infants born with physical and mental defects may well
fit within that broad definition." Id. at 402.
149. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a different view of the intent of the statute with
respect to infants, see United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1984),
and held that handicapped infants are indeed "handicapped individuals" under Section 504,
but that they are not "otherwise qualified" for treatment when the handicapping condition is
one of the alleged causes of the need for treatment. The result, of course, is the same as in
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler. Even though "the words and purpose of the stat-
ute plainly apply to a particilar situation," and even though "the fact that the specific applica-
tion of the statute never occurred to Congress does not bar [the court] from holding that the
situation falls within the statute's coverage," United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 159
(quoting United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085
(1980)), the Second Circuit refused to apply existing law to protect an infant who was a "hand-
icapped individual" covered by the statute because "the situation in question [here] is different
in kind, not just in degree, from the applications of section 504 discussed in the legislative
history," and that "Congress ... must first weigh the competing interests at stake in this
context" before the judiciary will allow the Executive Branch to act to apply the plain meaning
of the statute." Id., 729 F.2d. at 159-60, 161.
150. 729 F.2d at 161.
151. In his dissent in United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984),
Judge Winter pointed out that "Congress was persuaded that a handicapped condition is
analogous to race and that, so far as the administration of federal financial assistance is con-
cerned, discrimination on the basis of handicap should be on a statutory par with discrimina-
tion on the basis of race." Id. at 162. Given the "natural rights" foundation of the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions on race discrimination, see supra notes 122-31 and
accompanying text, such a finding would place the burden on those arguing against expansive
coverage for the handicapped. The majority in United States v. University Hosp., however,
placed the burden on the government, which sought to apply the statute in accordance with its
broad intention. As Judge Winter pointed out:
A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a bona
fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life threatening digestive
problem because an infant has Down's Syndrome is not a bona fide medical judg-
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vacy"-as-a-function-of-"liberty" rationale of Roe v. Wade and its progeny
will not allow the law based on a natural rights ethic to function in such
situations. 152
The process is similar, though not identical, in the case of incompetent or
ment. The issue of parental authority is also quickly disposed of. A denial of medi-
cal treatment to an infant because the infant is black is not legitimated by parental
consent....
Any doubt [in this case] must stem not from a deficiency in the argument based on
the analogy to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act but from a disagreement as to whether
a handicapped condition is fully analogous to race. See American Academy of Pediat-
rics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.D.C. 1983). Whether that doubt is justified
or not, however, courts are not the proper fora in which the reasonableness of the
analogy to race is to be judged.
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting).
152. The cases cited by Judge Gesell in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, were
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 687, 684-858 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). While only Carey can
be considered one of Roe's "progeny", all the cases cited, as well as numerous others which
rest upon them, are based on a theory that certain decisions, and access to the means to imple-
ment them, are outside the realm of legitimate government intervention, whether or not they
are actually "private" in nature. Compare, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 at 482,
486 (opinion of the Court), id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring) (relying on the privacy of the
marital bedroom and "the intimacies of the marriage relationship"), with, e.g., Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l (relying on "privacy" to permit minors access to sale of contraceptives) and
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (relying on "privacy" to strike health regulations gov-
erning the medical and business practices of abortion-providers). It is noteworthy that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied, in part, on the same cases to
support its conclusion that the Department of Health and Human Services could not rely on
Section 504 to support an investigation into allegations of discriminatory refusal of medical
care to a handicapped infant. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir.
1984) (citing Carey, Griswold and Roe, among others). At bottom, however, the rationale of
these cases is quite clear: the courts simply do not agree with the legislature's judgment con-
cerning the proper outcome. Roe, for example, rests explicitly on the notion that the legisla-
ture may not adopt "one theory of life" which would interfere with the liberty interests of the
pregnant woman. 410 U.S. at 163. The same rationale is employed implicitly when the lan-
guage and logic of Roe is utilized in cases involving disabled infants. See, e.g., American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983) (reference to "the
effort to preserve an 'unwanted' child"). It is safe to predict that the courts which prefer the
quality-of-life view would find it politically impossible to adopt an explicit statement that the
state simply may not interfere with parents who do not wish to raise a retarded or disabled
child, so the privacy rationale is a convenient substitute. Other writers, not having the need to
defend their views either politically or in higher courts, have taken the direct approach. The
most notable of these is the Australian ethicist Peter Singer who wrote:
We can no longer base our ethics on the idea that human beings are a special form of
creation, made in the image of God, singled out from all other animals, and alone
possessing an immortal soul. Our better understanding of nature has bridged the gulf
that was once thought to lie between ourselves and other species, so why should we
believe that the mere fact that a being is a member of the species Homo sapiens
endows its life with some unique, almost infinite, value?
Singer, supra note 72, at 129.
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seriously ill adults. In the case of adults, the order of inquiry is reversed;
with the inquiry into the "privacy"/"liberty" aspects of the case handled
first "'53 due to the well-settled common-law right of a competent adult to
refuse consent for unwanted medical treatment. 154 From that point, the dis-
cussion begins to look much like those involving third-party consent for non-
treatment of handicapped infants. The main difference, of course, is that the
guardian is said to be exercising the rights of the incompetent adult, rather
than his own.' Nevertheless, the result is the same: the preservation of an
incompetent adult's life depends upon the subjective evaluation of a court
and a guardian who will, in many if not most cases, depend either implicitly
or explicitly on quality-of-life criteria to determine whether to continue
treatment or render it in the first instance.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Conroy,156 bears
witness to the difficulties of attempting to soften the reality of what is being
authorized.' 57 Under the "subjective test" articulated in Conroy, the courts
are encouraged to undertake a search for the previously-expressed desires of
the incompetent adult,158 but it is not at all clear that those desires will
always be relevant.'" 9 Under the other two formulations approved in the
case - the "limited objective" and the "pure objective" tests,' 60 however,
153. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), rev'g, 190 N.J. Super. 453,
464 A.2d 303 (App. Div. 1983), rev'g, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983); In re Quin-
lan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Conroy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the privacy rationale it had adopted in Quinlan in favor of what it
considered to be a more accurate formulation: the concept of self-determination. Conroy, 98
N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223 & n.154.
154. See, e.g., Schloendorlf v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914) quoted in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985). Although
a thorough discussion of the common law treatment of unconsented touching, including medi-
cal care, as a battery is beyond the scope of this essay, it is relevant to the present discussion to
note that the right is not absolute, even for a competent adult. Thus, although the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he right of a person to control his own body is a basic societal
concept, long recognized in the common law," In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221,
it also expressly recognized that the common-law right to refuse medical care is not absolute
and must give way in the face of an important governmental interest. Id. at 348-54, 486 A.2d
at 1223-26. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Application of President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93, 96-97 (1984); State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
155. Compare In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985) with American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 265, 400-02 (D.D.C. 1983).
156. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) rev'g 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303, rev'g 188
N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232.
157. 98 N.J. at 391, 486 A.2d at 1246 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).
158. Id. at 360-64, 486 A.2d at 1229-31.
159. Id. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 1230-31. See also sources cited supra at note I11.
160. 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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neither the intention of the incompetent patients, nor their right to self-de-
termination can validly be claimed as the basis for decision.
Therefore the New Jersey Supreme Court was correct when it pointed out
that, "in the absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to
pretend that the right to self-determination serves as the basis for substituted
decision-making".1 61 The real issue is: what ethic - functional or natural
rights - will govern the law of New Jersey when the issue is whether the
state should permit termination of a patient's life on the basis of allegations
by a guardian or physician that death is in the patient's "best interests":
We hestitate, however, to foreclose the possibility of humane ac-
tions, which may involve termination of life-sustaining treatment,
for persons who never clearly expressed their desires about life-
sustaining treatment but who are now suffering a prolonged and
painful death. An incompetent, like a minor child, is a ward of the
state, and the state's parens patriae power supports the authority of
its courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that
serve the incompetent's best interests, even if the person's wishes
cannot be clearly established. This authority permits the state to
authorize guardians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment from an incompetent patient if it is manifest that such action
would further the patient's best interest in a narrow sense of the
phrase, even though the subjective test ... may not be satisfied.1 62
The language just quoted represents the New Jersey Supreme Court's ac-
ceptance of the method by which the pre-existing rights of the handicapped
elderly are placed in jeopardy.1 63 The details are to be worked out in later
cases, but the direction is clear. Each of the four assumptions accepted in
Buck v. Bell have been accepted here: the unfitness of an individual; the
power of the state to make quality-of-life judgements for its wards; the po-
tential that the individual might disagree, and the minor role that this poten-
tial for disagreement plays in deciding what is in his or her best interests.
The assumptions which would be implicit in a natural rights analysis do not
even enter the picture because, in the court's view, they might "foreclose the
161. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231. See also id. at 392-93, 486 A.2d at 1246-47.
162. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231. See also id. at 392-93, 486 A.2d at 1246-47. (Han-
dier, J., concurring and dissenting) ("What is really involved... is not so much the incompe-
tent's right to personal choice - nature has already deprived her of that - but rather what is
in her best interests.").
163. It should be noted at this point that the method is identical to that utilized in the case
of handicapped infants and neglect cases involving children: reliance on the power of parens
patriae. A thorough discussion of either the power itself or the means by which it has -been
used to advance a quality-of-life ethic is beyond the scope of this article. See generally The
Family and Public Policy, supra note 97.
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possibility of humane actions" to terminate life"' 4 in future cases involving
incompetents with dim medical prognoses.
But acceptance of a new governing ethic is a big step, and the court im-
plicitly recognized the risk it was taking when it emphasized that New
Jersey law "secure[s] for elderly patients, residents and clients of health care
facilities serving their specialized needs and problems, the same civil and
human rights guaranteed to all citizens."' 65 Its explicit rejection of a
"broad" quality-of-life formula 166 in favor of a narrower one which focuses
largely on the incompetent's susceptibility to pain demonstrates its concern
that the new ethic has an expansive logic of its own, and that express limita-
tions are needed:
Although we are condoning a restricted evaluation of the nature of
a patient's life in terms of pain, suffering, and possible enjoyment
under the limited-objective and pure-objective tests, we expressly
decline to authorize decision-making based on assessments of the
personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of that
life to others. We do not believe that it would be appropriate for a
court to designate a person with the authority to determine that
someone else's life is not worth living simply because, to that per-
son, the patient's "quality-of-life" or value to society seems negligi-
ble. The mere fact that a patient's functioning is limited or his
164. The distinction between terminating life itself and terminating life-sustaining treat-
ment is an important one which is discussed in the context of the Conroy case. For present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that the "life-sustaining treatment" was nothing more
than food and water provided by a nasogastric tube. It was not, therefore, "treatment" as that
term is commonly understood, notwithstanding the New Jersey court's conclusion that the
distinction between providing food and water and providing other treatments is more emo-
tional than real. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-74, 486 A.2d at 1236. This writer rejects that conclu-
sion as being inherently inconsistent with both the rights of patients to treatment and the duty
of the family and society to subscribe to the medical ethic which derives from the natural
rights formulation of human worth: primum non nocere ("first do no harm"). See infra Part
III. See also Corbett v. D'Alessandro, No. 84-5627 CA-JRT (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1985)
(Court held that a nasogastric tube could not be withheld or withdrawn from a person in a
permanently vegetative state because a state statute expressly stated that the provision of suste-
nance was not a form of life-prolonging procedure that may be discontinued or withheld).
165. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 379, 486 A.2d at 1239 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27G-1
(1981)).
166. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33. See also In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466,
472, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978) (indicating, in reference to possible resuscitation of half-
paralyzed, elderly victim of.Alzheimer's disease, that prolongation of life is not required if
there is no hope of return to a "normal integrated, functioning, cognitive existence"); DECID-
ING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 135 (endorsing termination
of treatment whenever surrogate decision-maker, in his discretion, believes it is in the patient's
best interests, defined broadly to "take into account such factors as the relief of suffering, the
preservation or restoration of functioning, and the quality as well as the extent of life
sustained").
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prognosis dim does not mean that he is not enjoying what remains
of his life or that it is in his best interests to die. (citations omitted]
More wide-ranging powers to make decisions about other people's
lives, in our view, would create an intolerable risk for socially iso-
lated and defenseless people suffering from physical or mental
handicaps....
When evidence of a person's wishes or physical or mental condi-
tion is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of preserving
life.167
The difficulty with this sort of reasoning is that it contains the seeds of its
own demise. The process of evaluating life on the basis of its quality rather
than its nature, once accepted, will inexorably lead to extensions of the ra-
tionale as the cases get .harder, and death appears as the most humane alter-
native under the circumstances. Justice Handler's dissenting opinion in
Conroy made the point explicitly when he observed that neither "justice,
efficacy, [n]or humaneness . . . would require a person to die", as Claire
Conroy did, with a nasogastric tube in place. 168 His preference was for the
"best interests" standard approved by the President's Commission.
16 9
Although Justice Handler's understanding of the "best interests" standard
suggested by the President's Commission is somewhat different than the
Commission's own definition, 17' he apparently preferred its view because it
does "not give determinative weight to the element of personal pain," and
because it does not "necessarily obviate other extremely important consider-
ations."' 7 1 In his view, the preferred standard "should accommodate as
comprehensively, fairly, and realistically as possible all concerns and values
that have a legitimate bearing on the decision whether to provide particular
treatment at the very end of an individual's life". 172 But a standard which
relies on "all concerns and values that have a legitimate bearing on the deci-
sion" identified in the President's Commission report is precisely the broad
quality-of-life standard the majority in Conroy thought it was rejecting.
Although the Commission's report claims that "[i]n applying the best in-
terest principle, [it] is concerned with the value of the patient's life for the
167. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367-68, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
168. Id. at 391, 486 A.2d at 1246.
169. Id. at 396-99, 486 A.2d at 1248-49 (quoting DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 135 (footnote omitted)).
170. Compare Conroy, 98 N.J. at 393-99, 486 A.2d at 1246-50 with DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 134-36 & nn.41-45.
171. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 392, 486 A.2d at 1246.
172. Id.
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patient,"' 173 it also states that the "impact of a decision on an incapacitated
patient's loved ones may be taken into account [by the surrogate] in deter-
mining someone's best interests, [because] most people do have an important
interest in the well-being of their families or close associates., '1 74 This is not
the "best-interests-of-the-patient-as-seen-through-the-eyes-of-the-patient"
standard it purports to be. It is a significant extension of the "pure subjec-
tive" and "limited objective" tests which would determine "what is in the
[patient's] best interests by reference to more objective, societally shared cri-
teria" without reference to the value of self-determination. 7 5  It is, in fact, a
"pure objective" test which expressly recognizes that the value of the pa-
tient's life to the patient "is impossible to discern with any certainty,"' 176 and
which relies instead on the views of "the average, reasonable person in the
patient's position" 177 to determine whether or not the patient's life creates
"emotional or financial burdens for their family or other people to whom
they were close."' 7 8
This is precisely the extension of the functional ethic correctly rejected by
the majority in Conroy, but accepted in other cases.179 It has absolutely no
place in a "best interests" discussion which purports to rely on "the value of
the patient's life for the patient,"' 18 rather than others' "estimates of the
patient's actual or potential productivity or social contribution;"'' for it
introduces precisely the quality-of-life standard it eschews by permitting the
well-being of others to be counted as a factor in determinations regarding the
value of the patient's life.'
8 2
173. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 135 n.43.
174. Id. at 135 & n.44 citing In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 435, 421 N.E.2d
40, 58 (1981).
175. Id. at 135.
176. Id. at 134 (footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 136.
178. Id. (footnote omitted).
179. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491
(1983).
180. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 135 n.43.
181. Id.
182. The Commission recognized the dangers for abuse inherent in a standard which relies
on the legally useful, yet fictional, "average, reasonable person in the patient's position" when
it asserted that "especially stringent standards of evidence should be required to support a
claim that the average, reasonable person in the patient's position would disregard personal
interests [for example, in prolonging life or avoiding suffering] in order to avoid creating emo-
tional or financial burdens for their family or other people to whom they were close." Id. at
136 & n.45 (citing Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. Summit
County, Ohio 1980)). Precisely what the nature of these "especially stringent" evidentiary
standards would be is an intriguing question which the Commission did not address.
The only "especially stringent" evidentiary standards currently in use are "clear and con-
vincing evidence" and "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt". See generally MCCORMICK ON
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In sum then, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy accepted a limited
functional definition of the rights of the human person when it "condon[ed]
a restricted evaluation of the nature of a patient's life in terms of pain, suffer-
ing, and possible enjoyment," but it did recognize the risk in allowing "as-
sessments of the personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value
of that life to others" to be the guide for third-party decision-making. By
contrast, the President's Commission report explictly advised that a func-
tional definition be accepted when it urged that the views of "the average,
resonable person in the patient's position"'1 3 regarding "the emotional or
financial burdens for their family or other people to whom they were
close"' 4 are to be given determinative weight if supported by credible
evidence.' 8 5
When considered together, Conroy and the decisions of federal and state
courts resolving the same issues in the context of handicapped infants and
children show a marked resemblance. In American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Heckler'8 6 the guardians were held to have a right to demand an inquiry
into "the quality of the infant's expected life"' 187 and the potential for ad-
verse "economic, emotional and marital effects on the family as a whole"
due to "the effort to preserve an unwanted child.' 8 8 In the original Indiana
EVIDENCE §§ 336-41 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). How either of these standards can be brought
to bear to determine the choice of an imaginary creature of legal fiction, the "average, reason-
able person in the patient's position," is not stated. More likely, the decision will be a simple
assumption of the sort which appears to have been made in the quotation from the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court which appears in footnote 44: "An individual who is part of a
closely knit family would doubtless take into account the impact his acceptance or refusal of
treatment would likely have on his family." DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 8, at 136 n.44 (quoting In re Richard Roe II, 421 N.E.2d 40, 58 (Mass.
1981)).
The contrast is notable. By rejecting the evidence before it concerning the incompetent's
wishes as insufficient, the Conroy majority emphasized that more convincing and relevant
proof than a mere recitation of the patient's deteriorating condition and assertions regarding
his or her alleged distaste for medical treatment was required under any of the three tests it
had just approved. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 385-87, 486 A.2d at 1243-44. The reason, in its
view, was obvious: "The consequences are most serious - life or death." Id. at 387, 486 A.2d
at 1244. The Commission report, on the other hand, does not rely on either the patient's own
assertions regarding treatment, or a stringent standard for determining what is in the patient's
best interests by reference to the patient's interests alone. It applies the undefined "especially
stringent standards" it recommends to the proof of what the "average, reasonable person in the
patient's condition" would do. In this writer's judgment, there is a considerable difference
between the two approaches. See infra notes 234-44 and accompanying text.
183. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 136 & n.45.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
187. Id. at 400.
188. Id.
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"Baby Doe" case,' 89 the decision to permit an infant with Down's Syndrome
to die of dehydration and starvation was based on the parents' judgment that
"Down's children never lead very good lives" and that "it would be wrong
to subject [the child] to a life of such an inferior kind."'9 Like the decision in
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 9' "[tihere were also [the par-
ents'] other two children to consider, [because it was alleged] severely handi-
capped child would place a tremendous burden on the family as a whole."' 92
An identical result was reached In re Phillip B. , a 1979 California case
involving parental refusal to permit a life-saving operation with minimal risk
on a twelve year old boy afflicted with Downs' Syndrome. The grounds: the
father's belief that "he would be better off dead" and the alleged detrimental
impact the child's condition had on his other two brothers. 94 Other cases
could be cited at both ends of the biological continuum,' 95 but the clear
trend is in the direction of quality-of-life judgments of the sort approved in
principle in the cases summarized above.
189. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
a.ffd sub noma., State of Indiana on Relation of Infant Doe by Guardian, No. 482 S 139 (Ind. S.
Ct. May 27, 1982), No. 482 S140 (Ind. S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
190. J. LYONS, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 32 (1985).
191. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
192. Lyons, supra note 190, at 32.
193. In re Phillip B, A. Minor, no. 66103 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif., Apr. 27,
1978), affd, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Phillip B. the Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, California transferred guardianship of the person of Phillip Becker to the couple who
sought to have the lifesaving surgery performed over the objections of Phillip's parents.
Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981 (August 7, 1981). For a detailed discussion of the
Becker case, see Destro & Moeller, Necessary Care for the Retarded Child: The Case of Phillip
Becker, 4 HUM. LIFE REV. 81 (1980).
194. See Destro & Moeller, supra note 193, at 89 & n.41 (quoting Transcript of Record, In
re Phillip B., A Minor, No. 66103 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Cal. Apr. 27, 1978)).
195. See, e.g., Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland, Me.
filed Dec. 14, 1979); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979). In contrast with
the cases resting on a quality-of-life ethic, the Houle court had little qualms about applying a
natural rights ethic:
[A]t the moment of live birth there does exist a human being entitled to the fullest
protection of the law. The most basic right enjoyed by every human being is the
right to life itself.... The issue before the court is not the prospective quality of the
life to be preserved, but the medical feasibility of the proposed treatment compared
with the almost certain risk of death should treatment be withheld. Being satisfied
that corrective surgery is medically necessary and medically feasible, the court finds
that the defendants herein have no right to withhold such treatment and that to do so
constitutes neglect in the legal sense.
Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Court, Cumberland, Me. filed December
14, 1979), quoted in J. Robinson, Legal Aspects of Withholding Medical Treatment from Hand-




The common thread in each of the cases is the functional ethic. Whether
the quality-of-life rationale is stated explicitly, or hidden behind invocations
of the talisman's of "privacy," "self-determination," or "medical judgment,"
the result is the same: the courts have accepted the initial premise of an
ethic which will, in time, swallow the carefully crafted legal protection pres-
ently available to those who are afflicted with disabilities. 196 Judicial author-
ization of third-party judgments that rest on express statements to the effect
that those with severe handicaps "never lead very good lives," that they are
"better off dead,"or that their right to equal treatment should depend on the
"economic, emotional and marital effects on the[ir] family as a whole,"' 97 is
an open invitation to the making of legal policy which is based on precisely
the "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded" condemned in the
Supreme Court's decision in the Cleburne Living Center 19' case discussed in
Part I.
D. Rejecting the Functional Definition: A Legal Argument
In the Introduction to Part II it was noted that the distinction between
"what is" and "what should be" in the law is often a fine one which tends to
be overlooked when there is pressure for the court "to do what is right"
under the circumstances. The cases summarized above in both the text and
the footnotes demonstrate that this is especially true when the issues pending
before a court involve difficult questions of biomedical ethics and public pol-
icy; the pressure to reach a humane result given the wrenching personal cir-
cumstances of the litigants is obvious from the language the courts
employ.' 99 Nonetheless, there can be no question that the duty of a court is
to apply the law as written if it is applicable to the case at hand; for it is the
196. The California Supreme Court's recent decision invalidating the statutory protection
against involuntary sterilization of the mentally incompetent, Conservatorship of Valerie N.,
40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985), is another example of the way in
which the functional ethic is given free reign once "privacy" and "self-determination" ratio-
nales are utilized to permit third-parties to exercise the alleged "rights" of the disabled on their
behalf. Existing legal protection, in this case California's prohibition against eugenic steriliza-
tion, CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (West 1985); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4500 (West
1985), falls under the relentless logic of constitutional reasoning now bereft of its natural rights
ethic. The only difference, in this writer's view, between cases such as Conservatorship of Vale-
rie N. and Buck v. Bell, is their rationale. Buck, at least, took a direct approach without
dressing it up in high-sounding statements of constitutional principle. At bottom, such
"rights" are nothing more than legal fictions when applied to a person incapable of exercising
the right. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr 387,
408-20 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
197. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983).
198. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3249.
199. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 364-65, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985) (quoted supra
in text accompanying note 162).
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legislatures, not the courts, which have the primary responsibility for the
formulation of public policy.2"
The difficulty arises when the law as written requires a result which the
judges or the litigants perceive to be inhumane, burdensome, or otherwise
inconsistent with what is considered to be an "appropriate" outcome given
the circumstances. This was clearly the case in American Academy of Pedi-
atrics v. Heckler,2 "1 United States v. University Hospital,2" 2 and In re Con-
roy.2"3 Each of the courts involved was cognizant that the law as written
certainly did not authorize the actions they took, and in both Heckler and
University Hospital they were aware that its plain language and legislative
history could be construed to prohibit them. 2" The means they employed to
skirt existing law was a process of functional definition and avoidance.
In both Heckler and University Hospital the central legal question was the
application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973205 to cases alleg-
ing refusal to treat handicapped newborns because their handicaps give them
a limited prognosis for a "normal" healthy childhood. Although the more
technical legal issues of the Section 504 controversy involved in the cases are
beyond the scope of this essay, the main issue - whether a handicapped
infant is an "otherwise qualified individual" who is protected by the statute
from discrimination in any federally funded program "solely by reason of his
[or her] handicap" - is not.
As Part I points out, the primary issue in the application of Section 504 is
whether or not a disabled person is able to reap the intended benefit of the
program or service offered by the federal grantee.20 6 If so, the disabled per-
sons must be offered at least the same level of benefits and services as are
offered to those without disabilities.20 7 The question in the Heckler and Uni-
versity Hospital cases, and the question which is currently before the
Supreme Court in Heckler v. American Hospital Association,208 is whether
this rule applies to handicapped infants2° when those charged with their
200. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 with, U.S. CONST. art. III.
201. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
202. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
203. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), rev'g, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983)
rev'g, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983).
204. It is interesting to note that shortly after the decision by the courts to invalidate the
regulations promulgated under Section 504, Congress adopted the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, which prohibit, among other things, failure to provide appropriate treatment, food
and water to disabled infants. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1982).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 53-68.
208. (unreported) (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
209. There is no question that such refusal to treat a child without a disability would con-
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primary care decide to reject the services because the child is disabled.210
The question is an important one, for it marks the first time the federal
courts have applied an overtly functional ethic to constitutional protection
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.211 Unlike Roe v. Wade,212
which created the right to abortion by limiting the class of "persons" enti-
tled to legal protection of their lives to those members of the human species
already born, 213 the cases involving newborns with disabilities are the first to
permit eugenic, functional criteria to determine the degree of protection to
those already born. As in Roe, the rationale employed is the alleged "pri-
vacy" of the parent-physician relationship, and the result is identical: denial
of existing legal protection for lives which do not meet whatever quality-of-
life criteria are employed by the parents or physicians. The significant point,
however, is that the "privacy" rationale is designed to eliminate the protec-
tion of the subject individuals by insulating the illegal activity of others from
legal scrutiny. By proceeding in this manner, the courts need never reach an
stitute child abuse (medical neglect) under the laws of every state. See sources cited supra note
114. The difficulty, of course, is that some courts charged with the responsibility of deciding
medical neglect cases also apply a functional standard to judge the future quality of the child's
life. In these cases, the parental refusal of care is deemed to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., A. Minor, no. 66103 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif.,
Apr. 27, 1978), aff'd, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949
(1980).
210. Phrased in this manner, the issue is identical to other medical neglect proceedings
where the parents refuse necessary medical treatment to their children. See sources cited supra
notes 112, 114. One of the most common reasons why parents refuse such treatment-reli-
gious objection-is, in fact, constitutionally based and rests on a far firmer constitutional
ground-the first amendment-than a vague and undefined "right to privacy." The difference
in result, however, is striking. It is a rare case indeed when parents are permitted to refuse
needed treatment to their children on religious grounds, notwithstanding the parents' express
constitutional right to free exercise of religion. See supra note 114. Even in the face of express
constitutional values which would seem to permit the parents wide latitude in choosing
whether and how their child shall be treated, the courts have no difficulty in holding that their
primary consideration must be the "best interests" of the child. It is only in cases where the
child has a disability: that is, where the child is not considered by the court, the juvenile
authorities, or the parents to have the potential for a "normal" childhood, that the usual rule
requiring consideration of only the child's interests is transmogrified into a rule which looks to
all the reasons why the child should not be treated or fed. See, e.g., American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983) (the potential for adverse "eco-
nomic, emotional and marital effects on the family as a whole" due to "the effort to preserve an
unwanted child"); In re Phillip B., supra note 193 (impact on family); J. LYONS, PLAYING
GOD IN THE NURSERY 32 (1985) (because "Down's children never lead very good lives" and
"it would be wrong to subject [the child] to a life of such an inferior kind") (summarizing In re
Infant Doe).
211. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
212. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
213. Id. at 158.
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overt discussion of the legitimacy of the functional, eugenic criteria used to
justify the lack of equal treatment.
Under Section 504, the only legally relevant inquiry concerns the child's
ability to reap the intended benefit from the treatment. If so, the next ques-
tion is whether the treatment which is denied a handicapped "unwanted"
infant would be provided for a "normal" or "wanted" infant suffering from
the same or a similar condition requiring identical treatment. Analyzed in
this manner, the issue in American Hospital Association 214 - whether or not
the government is entitled to documents which will enable it to determine
the criteria used by parents and physicians to deny treatment to infants with
disabilities - goes to the heart of the entire controversy over the gradual
adoption of a functional, eugenic ethic by American law. If hospitals receiv-
ing federal funds may bar inquiry by civil rights officials on grounds of fam-
ily privacy, the privacy rationale will have successfully prevailed over the
law's substantive requirements. If infants with disabilities are not "other-
wise qualified individuals" entitled to equal treatment under Section 504 or
state child neglect statutes because of their disabilities, 215 then the class of
persons entitled to equal protection of the laws has been narrowed by the
application of functional criteria.
The most obvious example of the application of the functional ethic to the
disabled is the "food and water" issue. That is: can food and water be with-
drawn with the intention of causing death by starvation of dehydration? The
issue is a key one, for it is clearly at the cutting or transitional "edge" of
current law.
From a legal perspective, the only question under Section 504 is whether
or not the disabled patient can receive the intended benefit from continued
feeding and hydration. The "common sense" approach to this question, of
course, is to ask what benefit food and water provides to those without disa-
bilities? The answer, quite simply, is that, along with shelter, food and water
are among the most basic requirements of life.216 No one can live without
214. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983)
Judge Gesell used the term "unwanted child" - a term common to the debates over abortion
- to describe a handicapped infant whose quality of life did not rise to the level desired by his
or her parents. Id.
215. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2nd Cir. 1984). See gener-
ally supra note 149.
216. The debate has not yet reached the stage where it has been argued that death by
exposure-the method preferred by the ancient Romans for disposing of unwanted infants and
by some bands of the Inuit for the disabled elderly, see generally, L. EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT
MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 13 & n.21 (0 & C.L. Temkin eds.,
C.L. Temkins trans. 1967);E. WEYERS, JR., THE ESKIMOS: THEIR ENVIRONMENT AND
FOLKWAYS, 137-39 (1939), should be permissible, although there has been commentary to the
effect that assisted suicide and active euthanasia should be permissible when the victim had no
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them, and refusal to provide them with the intent of causing death raises far
more substantial issues than simply overcoming the barriers caused by the
"emotional significance" or "symbolism" of feeding noted by the California
and New Jersey courts in Barber and Conroy.217
As was pointed out in Part I, Alexander v. Choate2"' held that "[t]he bal-
ance struck [by Section 504] requires that an otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit
that the grantee offers." '219 This means that the disabled must be offered at
least the same level of services as are offered to those without disabilities.
Taken together with the holding in Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis 220 that the handicapped individual must be able to reap the intended
benefit of the service offered, there can be no doubt that provision of food
and water in a manner which does not harm the patient - even if it does
nothing more than sustain life - is required by Section 504. More impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court made it clear in Choate that "[t]he benefit itself, of
course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denie[s] otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are
entitled."
221
prognosis for a quality-of-life considered by the victim or others alleged to be acting in the
victim's "best interests" to be acceptable. See, e.g., Levin & Arluke, Getting Rid of Old People
Minn. Star and Tribune, Oct. 7, 1983, at 19A, col 3; Otten, Can't We Put My Mother To
Sleep?, Wall St. J., June 5, 1985 at 133 col. 3. In this writer's judgment, the reasons that
starvation and dehydration are currently being urged - notwithstanding their physical cruelty
- is that they can be carried out under medical auspices which give an aura of respectability
to actions which, if performed outside a hospital on a healthy person, would promptly be
branded as murder. In addition, the fact that some forms'of feeding and hydration do involve
medical treatments of questionable value and risk to the patient gives credence to the argument
that all feeding performed by medical personnel "in the realm of complex, high-technology
medical care" is "medical treatment." This appears to have been the position adopted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy, and it was recently adopted by the American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-74, 486
A.2d at 1235-37 and sources cited therein. See generally E. HEALY, MEDICAL ETHICS (1956);
Lo & Dornbrand, Sounding Board.- Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Caring for the Demented
Elderly, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 402(1984); Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given
Food and Water?, 13 Hastings Center Rep. 17 (1983); Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations
and the Absolute Requirement to Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, I L. MED.
& HEALTH CARE 210 (1983); J. PICCONE, LAST RIGHTS: TREATMENT AND CARE ISSUES IN
MEDICAL ETHICS (1984); Zerwekh, The Dehydration Question, 13 NURSING 83 (1983). See
also Rust, Feeding Withdrawal Gets Conditional Nod, Am. Med. News, Mar. 28, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
217. Barber v..Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490
(1983); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
218. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
219. Id. at 721.
220. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
221. Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. at 721.
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Thus, the "food and water" issue must be seen for what it is: the entering
wedge of an ethic which would permit intentional steps to end the lives of
the disabled. Because the functional ethic would permit such action only
when the individual is disabled, the threat to existing law protecting the dis-
abled is clear. Once intentional steps to cause death - rather than passive
measures which permit the condition or disease to take its natural course -
have been approvec4 the inescapable conclusion is that it is the existence of
the disabled person which constitutes the undesirable condition.
The "remedy" for certain disabilities under the functional ethic is death.
Food and water - the basic requirements of life itself - are redefined as
medical "treatments" which can be withdrawn when the patient can no
longer be made whole. Death, then, becomes the "final solution" for those
whose disabilities make them - to borrow a phrase - "useless eaters".
If there were any doubt regarding the direction of the cases in which the
new ethic is being urged on the courts, one need only examine the facts in
Brophy and the recently-filed New Jersey case, In re Jobes.222 In neither case
is it seriously alleged that artificial feeding causes harm to the patient beyond
maintaining their existence in a "vegetative" state. The real claim in these
cases is that the disabled must be able to gain a greater benefit from food and
water - relief from the disability itself - than those whose prognoses are
good.
Death by starvation and dehydration is the common thread which runs
through New Jersey's Conroy and Jobes, Massachusetts' Brophy v. New Eng-
land Siani Hospital,22 California's Barber v. Superior Court,224 and the orig-
inal Indiana "Baby Doe" case.225 Each of the individuals involved were
222. In re Jobes, No. C-4971-85E (Super. Ct., Ch. Div., Morris City, N.J.) (pending). The
case involves a 30-year-old woman whose condition is not comatose, and who is able to re-
spond in a limited manner to verbal commands to move her toes, and who will follow move-
ment in her room with her eyes. She is not in imminent danger of death, but her prognosis for
recovery is not good. See Nursing Home Opposes Removal of Comatose Woman's Life Support,
The Star-Ledger, Newark, New Jersey, Oct. 17, 1985, at A43, col. -. ; Press Advisory Regard-
ing The Matter of Nancy Ellen lobes, 10-17-85, by owners of Lincoln Park Nursing & Conva-
lescent Home, Jeryl Turco, Licensed Nursing Home Administrator and Carla Turco Scolari,
Licensed Nursing Home Administrator (opposing the removal of the feeding tube by court
order because patient is not terminally ill, the provision of nutrients and water for this patient
is not extraordinary care and the removal would jeopardize "[long standing medical and nurs-
ing principles and sentiments, i.e., is to heal, comfort and sustain life, through common medi-
cal procedures and care...").
223. Brophy, Guardian v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 85E009-GI (Mass. P. & Fain.
Ct. filed Oct. 21, 1985).
224. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195, Cal. Rptr. 484, (1983).
225. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982), afl'd
sub nom., State of Indiana on Relation of Infant Doe by Guardian, No. 482, 5139 (Ind. S. Ct.
May 27, 1982), No. 482, 5140 (Ind. S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
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suffering from disabling conditions, and in all the cases there was little, if
anything, which could be done to correct their respective "defects." Clar-
ence Herbert 226 was in a stuper caused by brain damage. Conroy was se-
verely impaired by chronic brain syndrome and Brophy suffered severe
midbrain damage which blocked his capacity to respond to most stimuli.
Both were described as being in "persistent vegetative states".227 Jobes is
severely brain-damaged and functionally impaired.228 Baby Doe was a
Down's Syndrome child (mental retardation). Food and water would not
cure them, but it would sustain their existence. The key is the disability -
from Quinlan's and Herbert's total disability, to Infant Doe's mental retar-
dation. Their life had lost its "value" to others. For each, the prescription
of the functional ethic is the same: death by neglect, dehydration and starva-
tion229 because the person was incurably disabled. In the eyes of those
charged with the duty to protect and care for them they were no longer
persons "in the whole sense."
The conclusion is now inescapable that the severely disabled have been
singled out for lesser protection than the law would provide to "normal"
patients with a good prognosis for recovery.23 In Brophy the trial court
Although the primary issue in this case was the provision of basic surgery to correct an intesti-
nal blockage which made feeding by mouth impossible, the intended result of this action was to
cause death by withholding oral or intravenous food and water. There can be no question that
had the child been born without Down's Syndrome and with an intestinal blockage, the sur-
gery would have been performed. See supra note 114.
226. Barber v. Superior Court, supra note 224, involved an attempted prosecution of two
physicians, Barber and Nejdl, for the death of one Clarence Herbert due to withdrawal of food
and water.
227. As found by the court in Brophy, "a persistent vegetative state" is "a condition in
which the patient:
(a) shows no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication;
(b) demonstrates no purposeful movement or motor ability;
(c) is unable to interact purposely with sti[m]ulation provided by his environment;
(d) is unable to provide for his own basic needs;
(e) demonstrates all of the above for longer than three months.
Brophy, Guardian v. New England Sinai Hospital, No. 85E009-G1, slip op. at 10 (Mass. P. &
Fam. Ct. Oct. 21, 1985) (finding of fact #29).
228. Letter to Richard Traynor, Esq. from Maurice Victor, M.D., Director, Department of
Neurology, Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital (December 12, 1985) (discussing diagno-
sis) (available in author's file). See also supra note 222.
229. In Brophy, the court noted that "Brophy's attending physician was unable to imagine
a more cruel and violent death then [sic] thirsting to death." Brophy, slip op. at 29 (finding
# 109).
230. The recent Florida murder case of Roswell Gilbert, convicted of murder for shooting
his 73 year-old wife because she was suffering from Alzheimer's disease, is only one recent
example of the gradual breakdown of the natural rights ethic. State v. Gilbert, No. 85-2596
CF. (Broward County, Fla., May 9, 1985) (jury verdict), appeal pending, No. 85-1129 (4th
Dist. Ct. App.). See also Lane, The Legal Year in Pictures, 71 A.B.A.J., Dec., 1985, at 63.
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found that "approximately 42% of the patients at the hospital were unable
to feed themselves and required some form of artificial feeding,, 231 and that
"[a] person who was otherwise healthy, would be quite capable of leading a
normal, active lifestyle, which would include employment" with the type of
feeding involved in that case (a gastrotomy tube).232 Entitlement to equal
protection of the law appears to turn on whether the individual is "otherwise
healthy," rather than on his or her status as a "person " under the law. The
protection afforded life and equality by the specific language of the Constitu-
tion itself has been changed in a fundamental way, without public debate,
without legal formalities, 233 and, most of all, without a clear understanding
that the natural rights of every citizen have been diluted by judges who are
sworn to uphold them.
III. ETHICAL CLARITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
From the perspective of law, terminology is important. In the words of
the President's Commission "[l]aw is one of the basic means through which
a society translates its values into policies and applies them to human con-
duct., 234 Because words used in laws and judicial opinions have specific
meanings, and the legal policy contained in that body of law has a substan-
tial impact on the individuals and society which it governs, the public is
entitled to clear notice of what meaning policymakers attach to the words
they use. And when, as here, differences of opinion concerning the values of
society which define the meaning of laws protecting the disabled and elderly
may adversely affect constitutionally protected rights, the need for clarity is
critical. 23'5 Ambiguous legal terminology permits those having the power to
enforce the law virtually limitless discretion to act in accordance with their
231. Brophy, slip op. at 15.
232. Id. (finding of fact #55).
233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § V.
234. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT supra note 8, at 30. Kelsen
saw law as a "coercive order of human behavior" and that "the norms of the legal order
regulate [it]." H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 31 (M. Knight trans. 1967):
"The first characteristic, then, common to all social orders designated by the word
'law' is that they are orders of human behavior. A second characteristic is that they
are coercive orders. This means that they react against certain events, regarded as
undesireable [sic] because detrimental to society, especially against human behavior
of this kind, with a coercive act; that is to say by inflicting on the responsible individ-
ual an evil - such as deprivation of life, health, liberty or economic values - which,
if necessary, is imposed upon the affected individual even against his will by the
employment of physical force."
Id. at 33.
235. For a general discussion of the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth
in the context of freedom of speech, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 730-38 (5th ed. 1980).
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own personal predilictions, bounded only by their own ad hoc determina-
tions respecting their own authority.23 6 When the law is ambiguous, who
but a superior authority is to say that those with enforcement authority are
wrong? As Judge Ralph Winter has noted in dissent in United States v. Uni-
versity Hospital:
237
Ambiguity pervades the majority opinion as to exactly which serv-
ices and which handicapped persons are excluded from the statute.
All one can know for certain is that some medical services may be
denied to some handicapped persons, without running afoul of Sec-
tion 504. The majority even implies, inter alia, that Section 504
may not apply at all to the provision of medical services... in the
face of the explicit statement of the Senate Report that it "was
enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individ-
uals ... in . . . health services." . . . [T]he majority opinion also
implies that ... only certain kinds of handicapped persons are ex-
cluded. If that interpretation stands, then the federal courts may
be forced to resolve individually each of these human tragedies
and moral dilemmas.23 8
Although federal and state courts are. quick to recognize and condemn
such ambiguity in the policy pronouncements of legislative and executive
bodies, the jurists writing majority opinions seem unable or unwilling to
judge their own pronouncements by the same standard. The problem of un-
fettered judicial discretion is all the more serious when one considers that
the judiciary is the only branch which lays claim to an indefeasible right to
interpret the basic law in a manner which is binding on all others and revers-
ible only by change of opinion or constitutional amendment. "We live under
the Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is," said the
late Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in 1907.239
But Hughes was wrong about the Constitution, even though the judges
often succeed in their attempts to avoid the political processes which are the
centerpiece of representative democracy. He was wrong because his com-
ments both beg the question, and miss the point.
As applied to the issues discussed in this essay, it should be clear that
judges have no authority, and even less (if that is possible) claim of expertise
to undertake the task of redefining the fundamental ethic on which the con-
236. Constitutional law recognizes this principle when courts accept a "limiting construc-
tion" on an otherwise vague or ambiguous legal term. Compare Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941) with Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
237. 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 162-63 (citation omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388).
239. See supra note 79.
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stitutional protection of human individuals is based. Their reliance on ethi-
cal "experts" who appear as witnesses or amici curiae does not supply what
is missing either; for neither the judges, nor the self-appointed ethical "ex-
perts" are constitutionally adequate substitutes for the elected representa-
tives of the people themselves. As a legal matter, the opinion of a judge or
ethical "expert" that the "natural rights" ethic of the Constitution or Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is outmoded as applied to disabled
infants is simply that - an opinion: interesting, but legally irrelevant.24" As
a practical matter, however, the opinion of the judge that the court has the
discretion to rewrite the ethic by indirection, is a serious matter indeed. For
when that discretion is guided by an ethic as foreign to basic human rights
principles as the functional ethic is to the natural rights theory on which
American constitutional law is based, the law and the society which it gov-
erns will undergo a revolution in its basic approach to human rights ques-
tions.24' Outcome, not principle, will be the goal, and inequality and
discrimination will be the outcome.2 4 2 There will be no need to fret about
240. See supra note 92.
241. Once again, it seems appropriate to note that most of the countervailing interests men-
tioned in the President's Commission report - self-determination, well-being, and equity -
have little if anything to do with cases involving disabled newborns or severely disabled adults.
When there is no clear evidence respecting the individual's "self-determination," candor com-
pels the conclusion that it is a non-issue. Similarly, "well-being" is a perfectly legitimate crite-
rion assuming that the medical intervention contemplated will result in harm, but it is
stretching the concept to its breaking point to assert that death is in a patient's best interests
whenever the intervention will do nothing more than palliate or maintain. Equity is the most
problematic, for it seeks to balance the value of the patient's life against the interests of others
or the desires of the hypothetical "reasonable person in the patient's condition" when faced
with questions of resource allocation. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
242. As pointed out in the introduction to this essay, the debate over the right of the dis-
abled and handicapped to equal treatment by the law has significant parallels in the areas of
affirmative action and separation of church and state. Because the Supreme Court has yet to
define whether "separation" or "religious freedom" is the core principle of the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment, it has mandated discrimination in the distribution of public
benefits in the face of legislative determination to provide equal treatment for individuals who
exercise their right to choose not to attend state schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925). See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (Neither Congress nor the State of Michigan could constitution-
ally require or permit the provision of on-site remedial or enrichment educational services
identical to those offered children in the public schools to children whose parents exercised
their constitutional right to choose a religious education because of the appearance of a "sym-
bolic union of government and religion," even though "no evidence of specific incidents of
religious indoctrination" had been proved.). Similarly, the lower courts have approved affirm-
ative action programs which, although explicitly stating a racial or ethnic preference, further a
result consistent with a social welfare conception of "equality", largely because the Supreme
Court has yet to come to grips with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-40 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents of the
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"slippery slopes"; the slope itself will be levelled. 43
This is precisely the difficulty with recent judicial pronouncements cutting
back on the protection afforded certain classes of disabled infants and adults.
Words which do have a clear legal meaning (i.e., "no person shall be de-
prived of life," "food and water") have either been avoided altogether, or
rendered ambiguous by judicial acceptance of a result-oriented, functional
human rights ethic (viz: calling hydration "treatment" in order to avoid the
implications of accuracy). And those which have no fixed meaning (i.e.
"treatment," "death") now mean whatever the court considers to be consis-
tent with the adoption of the new ethic.2 "
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 546 F. Supp. 1195
(E.D. Mich. 1982), af'd, 746 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015.
An interesting perspective on this issue as it relates to equality is presented in Howard &
Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act - Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality
Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615 (1983), in which the authors point out that the creation of
"safe" voting districts for minorities alleged to be required by the fourteenth amendment and
the Voting Rights Act may conflict with what they describe as the "political equality norm,"
which would restrict legislative or judicial ability to gerrymander for political or social pur-
poses. The key, of course, is to arrive at a principled definition of key terms. If unacceptable
results are achieved, the political process is available to adjust them. See generally Destro,
Equality, Social Welfare and Equal Protection, 9 HARV. J. LAW & PuB. POL'Y 51"(1986).
243. The President's Commission found that the cost of accepting "slippery slope" argu-
ments might be "the continued prohibition of some conduct which is actually acceptable."
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT supra note 8, at 28-30. While this
statement is true insofar as it affects activities which may be acceptable, the point made in the
text is to emphasize that without a clear anchor in first principle, the law can rapidly progress
to the point where unacceptable behavior is sanctioned. It is the ethic which governs the
policymakers, not their propensity to excess, which must be the subject of judicial and public
scrutiny. Once the ethic itself undergoes revision, it is pointless to speak of "slippery slopes";
the concept presumes slippage from an identifiable point of principle. If that point is changed,
the contours of the slope itself change with it. The President's Commission implicitly recog-
nized this point, but did not discuss its importance, when it quoted the following language
from Sisela Bok's Death & Dying.: Euthanasia and Sustaining Life: Ethical Views, in I ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 268, 277 (1978):
We do not always possess clear natural lines. Such a realization is sometimes though
to imply that all distinctions are useless, so long as they are not mirrored in nature.
But it is crucial to see that, even though a line is not drawn in nature, it may well be
needed in practice.. . . All social policy requires the drawing of lines.... Prohibi-
tions have to be established and distinctions made even where human affairs are un-
certain and hard to classify.
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 29-30 n. 52.
One need only look at the development of the case law and recent news reports concerning
the incidence of alleged "mercy killings," including one in California in which several nurses
were held at gunpoint and forced by the son of a cancer patient to "pull the plug" on his
father's life support systems, to see that the public is beginning to sense that the ethic gov-
erning the permissibility of active measures has weakened. Arraignment in Gunpoint Mercy
Killing, United Press International, Dec. 24, 1985 (available on NEXIS, NEXIS library, wires
file). See also sources cited supra notes 216, 222-30.
244. In Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1984), the court, in its zeal to bring the
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Thus, the central issue in cases such as Indiana's Baby Doe, Jobes, Conroy,
Barber, and Brophy is not "treatment" at all, but whether the law will permit
the intentional termination of the lives of disabled persons because there is
no current way to improve their disabling conditions. The law has now
reached a "point of no return": a point where policymakers and judges have
a legal and moral obligation to recognize frankly that it is not the disease or
disability which kills the patient, but an act of omission done with the spe-
cific intent of bringing about the death of a disabled individual.2 45 Once this
point is passed, the distinction between acts of commission and omission,
when both are intended to kill, becomes more apparent than real.24 6
For the law to afford less protection to the lives of the disabled because of
decisional law of New Jersey up-to-date with the most recent medical thinking, obliterated
most of the distinctions which have been useful in highlighting the issues in the debate over
euthanasia of the terminally ill. Food and water become "treatments" because there is no
point to maintaining the "emotional significance" of feeding in such a complex medical envi-
ronment; an educated medical opinion that the person will die within six months becomes the
functional equivalent of imminent death; and "active" and "passive" measures become indis-
tinguishable for legal purposes. Id. at 369-74, 486 A.2d at 1233-37. There is not much of a
"slope" left to slide down after all this. Similarly, in the late 1970's much of the debate cen-
tered over the acceptability of the Harvard "brain death" criteria. Not so today. The issue
before the courts in cases such as Conroy and Brophy is not whether the afflicted individual is
dead - they are not - the issue is whether they should be dead, and what steps can be taken
to hasten the process. But this is not how the issue is framed for the court; the approach is
more indirect. The incompetent person is said to be "vegetative": "functionally" dead, a
"vegetable," not a person. The infant with disabilities is similarly depersonalized, and serious
commentators and judges debate whether a law which refers to "handicapped persons" even
applies to such a child. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. The disabled child is
now a "defective" newborn, and the quality of its life is evaluated by a formula: QL=NE X
(H+S) where QL=Quality of Life; NE=Natural Endowment, both physical and intellectual;
H=the contribution of home and family; and S=the contribution from society. Shaw, Defin-
ing the Quality of Life, 7 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11 (1977); Gross, Cox, Tatyrek, Pollay &
Barnes, Early Treatment and Decision Makingfor the Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PE-
DIATRIcs 450 (1983).
245. The California case noted supra note 243 involving a son forcing nursing personnel, at
gunpoint, to terminate his father's life support systems after surgery, and the coroner's subse-
quent ruling that the father died - not as a result of the son's actions, but from the disease
which brought him to the hospital (cancer) - is a pristine example of the manner in which the
law avoids facing the difficult questions. While this writer would not presume to question the
coroner or prosecutor's motives for deciding as they did, there is no question that there is an
implicit message in the decision not to file an information for murder. Whether the prosecut-
ing authorities were sympathetic with the son's (or the father's) plight, or feared that a jury
might be, will never be known.
246. The recent Florida murder case of Roswell Gilbert, a man convicted of murder for
shooting his 73 year-old wife because she was suffering from Alzheimer's disease, is a good
example of this trend. See supra note 230. Mr. Gilbert argued after his conviction that he
should be pardoned because the killing was justifiable as an act of "mercy killing." See Lane,
The Legal Year in Pictures 71 A.B.A.J., Dec. 1985, at 63. The argument was rejected by a
majority of the Florida governor's cabinet. Id.
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their disability raises profound questions under the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment because it reflects the age-old prejudice against
the mentally retarded and disabled condemned in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cleburne Living Center.24 7 Worse, it entangles the law in the
profound ethical and moral question of whether the ultimate aim of medical
treatment is always to cure or rehabilitate,248 without the benefit of full and
open debate over the social implications of such a policy in the only forum
designed for such debate - the legislature.
Thus, it is time to admit frankly that the law has now regressed, by incre-
ments, to the stage where it is now arguably legitimate to authorize active
steps which are intended to end a person's life because he or she is dis-
abled.249 That such activity is prohibited under existing statutory and con-
247. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3262, 3266-
72(1985) (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Ste-
vens, J., & Burger, CJ., concurring).
248. In 1949, Leo Alexander, an observer at the trials of the Nazi war criminals at
Nuremburg wrote that it was the shift in ethic within the medical profession which allowed the
terror to begin; the law simply took advantage of an already fertile climate of eugenic opinion
and developed it far beyond the point most would consider civilized:
The original concept of medicine and nursing was not based on any rational or feasi-
ble likelihood that they could actually cure and restore but rather on an essentially
maternal or religious idea. The Good Samaritan had no thought of nor did he actu-
ally care whether he could restore working capacity. He was merely motivated by
the compassion in alleviating suffering. Bernal states that prior to the advent of sci-
entific medicine, the physician's main function was to give hope to the patient and to
relieve his relatives of responsibility.
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of
the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia
movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in
its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Grad-
ually the sphere of those to be included in this category was enlarged to encompass
the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and fi-
nally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-
in lever from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude
toward the nonrehabilitable sick.
It is, therefore, this subtle shift in attitude that one must thoroughly investigate.
Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MED. 39, 41 & n. 17 (1949)
(quoting J. BERNAL, THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF SCIENCE 44 (6th ed. 1946)). See also sources
cited supra note 73.
249. Although few would argue overtly that the physician's only role is to heal, the law of
medical malpractice has come very close to making the physician a guarantor of positive re-
sults. Obstetricians and gynecologists are now charged by the law of many states with the duty
to warn parents that their unborn offspring are likely to be disabled, so that abortion will
afford them the opportunity to "prevent" the problems associated with having a child with an
incurable disability by eliminating the child through an eugenic abortion. It is the very exist-
ence of a child with a disability which has become the actionable harm, and the physician is
expected to take steps to "prevent" the damage, whether before birth through abortion, or
19861
128 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:71
stitutional law is a proposition so obvious that it would be a waste of time to
argue it. The real issue is whether that law should be changed, and, if so, by
whom and on what grounds?
The prejudice against the disabled and those with mental disabilities is a
strong one, with a long and sordid history.2 ° If the courts are to counte-
afterwards by denial of appropriate treatment, or food and water. In either case, the reasoning
is the same: the life of a child with severe disabilities is not worth living.
The same reasoning appears to be creeping into the thinking of courts dealing with the
disabled at later and terminal stages of life. The "elderly, incompetent nursing-home resident
with severe and permanent mental and physical impairments and a life-expectancy of approxi-
mately one year or less," In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 363, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1984), may now
be dealt with in the same manner as the disabled infant - death by starvation and dehydration
- if life-sustaining treatment does not offer the hope of a return to a "normal, integrated,
functioning, cognitive existence." In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134,
138 (1978) (elderly, half-paralyzed victim of Alzhiemer's disease). See also DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 8, at 135 (arguing for an objective "best
interests" standard which will "take into account such factors as the ... preservation or resto-
ration of functioning, and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained"). But cf In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33 (comparing its approach to those cited above). In
keeping with this trend, the recent Jobes case in New Jersey seeks to extend the Conroy ap-
proach to include a 30 year-old female nursing home patient who is neither brain-dead, coma-
tose, nor terminal within the one-year time period. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
The "wrongful birth" cases cited supra impose a duty on the physician to warn, and hence,
to test for potential genetic defects. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.
1981) (Alabama law); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954
(1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698
P.2d 315 (1984); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa.
76, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975). When states have mandated the disclosure of information concerning the physical
characteristics of normal fetuses, however, the courts have ruled uniformly that such informa-
tion interferes with the right to choose abortion recognized by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), because it is designed to prejudice the choice in favor of childbirth. See, e.g., City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 442-49 (1983); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. post-
poned, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). From these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the courts
have concluded that prenatal physiological characteristics are not relevant to the choice of a
woman to have the child unless the child is disabled. Then, and only then, do the courts permit
detailed physiological information concerning fetal characteristics to be disclosed. See Blake v.
Cruz, 108 Idaho at 244, 698 P.2d at 318-22 (1984) (noting that although several courts have
rejected claims based on the birth of normal, healthy children, "no court has rejected claims
involving children with birth defects" because "society has a vested interest in reducing and
preventing birth defects"). Accord Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (cost of
raising a normal child unavailable as damages, but excess cost of raising a disabled child is
recoverable).
250. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (approving sterilization of the men-
tally retarded confined to state institutions because, among other things, "three generations of
imbeciles are enough"). Peter Singer is equally direct in his view of the severely retarded
infant:
Once the religious mumbo-jumbo surrounding the term "human" has been stripped
away, we may continue to see normal members of our species as possessing greater
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nance that prejudice by permitting 'guardians to starve their wards, they
should do so directly rather than mask them in high-sounding arguments
claiming to rely on "privacy" and "self-determination." In cases where the
patient is incompetent, the only "privacy" and "determination" being served
is that of the guardian, not the ward. As Richard McCormick, S.J., has
pointed out, such arguments both "beg the question and miss the point."'25 ,
And they do so for a purpose: to hide the fact that the law is being changed
through judicial acceptance of an ethic which prefers to redefine the law's
capacities of rationality, self-consciousness, communication, and so on, than mem-
bers of other species; but we will not regard as sacrosanct the life of each and every
member of our species, no matter how limited its capacity for intelligent or even
conscious life may be. If we compare a severely defective human infant with a non-
human animal like a dog or a pig, for example, we will often find the nonhuman to
have superior capacities, both actual and potential, for rationality, self-consciousness,
communication, and anything else that can plausibly be considered morally signifi-
cant. Only the fact that the defective infant is a member of the species Homo Sapi-
ens leads it to be treated differently from the dog or pig. Species membership alone,
however, is not morally relevant.
If we can put aside the obsolete and erroneous notion of the sanctity of all human
life, we may start to look at human life as it really is: at the quality of life that each
human being has or can achieve. Then it will be possible to approach these difficult
questions of life and death with the ethical sensitivity that each case demands, rather
than with ... blindless to individual differences....
The difficulty with this rationale, however, is that it has no stopping point. The "sensitivity
that each case demands" is a focus on the precise individual differences which have been the
basis for discrimination against the disabled and mentally retarded. Certain courts have al-
ready adopted the functional ethic, and it is quite clear that they are not stopping with those
who are in "vegetative" states: Phillip Becker was a otherwise healthy twelve-year old with
Down's Syndrome who would die without surgery to correct a heart wall defect; Infant Doe
was an otherwise healthy infant with another condition related to Down's Syndrome, duodenal
atresia, and Nancy Jobes is a 30 year-old woman who is non-comatose, but considered by her
family to be "vegetative". The law simply expands, and ethicists argue for "sensitivity ... to
individual differences" which will only expand it further. See also Conservationship of Valerie
N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760 (1985). See generally Hentoff, The Awful
Privacy of Baby Doe, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1985, at 54-62.
251. Once again, it is useful to note Richard A. McCormick's argument that [m]ost of the
analyses that deserve the title "poor" or "invalid" fit into either of two categories petitio
principii (begging the question), or ignorantia elenchi (missing the point). MoralArgument and
Christian Ethics, supra note 86, at 13. In this context, bad legal arguments are, in this writer's
opinion, those which rely on the opinions of ethical experts to argue for judicial change in
existing law without reference to established policy protecting the disabled. Were the ethical
opinions put forth in such cases so universally accepted as to be legitimate grounds for judicial
decisions, there would be little doubt that the law would change in its normal way: through
enactment and repeal of new statutory norms. Thus, all the judicial and ethical question-
begging does indeed have a point: to change the law without regard to the sometimes messy
and unpredictable legislative and political processes prescribed by state and federal
constitutions.
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essential terms, rather than to state explicitly its goals and their implications
for those with disabilities.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the law is in the process of adopting a functional definition of the
value of the human person, but it is doing so by indirection. If the law
cannot countenance a direct statement that the severely disabled are, in the
words of one guardian who refused treatment for his son, "better off dead,"
then it should act accordingly and refuse to permit guardians to starve their
wards. That there are profound questions of medical ethics and morality
involved in this debate is not open to serious question, but the ethical and
moral debate must not be confused with the requirements of the law as it
now stands. Whether the law should be legislatively infused with a new
ethic is another question, for another essay. But my remarks to this point
leave very little doubt that I do not believe that courts should fill the vacuum
created by legislative inaction by simply resolving cases in favor of the death
of the ward. The principles involved are far too important, and ad hoc deci-
sion-making in emotional cases is making bad law. Though it may take
some time, I do believe that we will live to regret leaving to lawyers, doctors,
judges, legislators and ethicists the important task of deciding who among
the disabled shall live, and who shall die. We have been down that road
before.
